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How AI agents shape experts' judgment calls

How AI agents shape experts’ judgment calls

Hacker News 最新firasd2026/10/30 · 18 天前30 分钟阅读

以下正文同步自 Hacker News 最新,版权归原站所有,已转换为易读排版。

How AI agents shape experts’ judgment calls

Read the paper

01Study design

02Results

03Our study’s limitations

04What this means

Published

Amaç Herdağdelen, Hailey Joren, Alex Tamkin

When experts hand their work to an AI agent, the usual assumption is that they still make the decisions that matter. The agent writes the code, runs the numbers, and offers advice, but the expert decides what to measure, how to interpret ambiguous evidence, and what the next steps should be. Often there is more than one reasonable answer to these questions, and the decision will come down to the experience and values of whoever makes the call.

We wanted to look at whether experts really do make those important decisions, or whether in practice they defer to their AI agents. In a study we report in a new paper, we asked 50 professional analysts to do a realistic statistical analysis with Claude Code. They all had experience in causal inference—that is, working out from data whether one thing causes another. Their task was to advise a farming cooperative on whether an advisory service it was running was effective and should be expanded.

Along the way, the analysts had to make four choices between two reasonable options, such as whether to measure productivity as crop yield per hectare or as yield per unit of operating cost, and then make a final decision. To see whether they were making these calls themselves, we set up each analyst’s agent to favor one option on each decision, which the analysts weren’t told about. Which way the agents would “lean” would be decided by coin flip. The agent was told to make the best honest case for its lean, to change its mind if the evidence demanded it, and never to mislead.

Across the four analytical choices, analysts went with their agent’s lean 86% of the time. If the agent’s input made no difference, we’d expect about 50%. When analysts had already expressed their own preference before the agent weighed in, they switched away from it 60% of the time if the agent disagreed, compared to 6% if it agreed.

Afterward, when asked to explain their choices, 77% of analysts used the agents’ own arguments—sometimes word for word—but only 15% credited the agent as the source of those arguments. Analysts who followed the agents’ recommendations closely were about as confident in their final recommendation as the rest, and roughly as likely to call it the product of their own judgment.

We don’t know how much this tells us about the real world. Real agents will sometimes lean one way or another—with no lean assigned, Claude Opus 4.8 made the same five choices in 112 out of 123 runs—but in this case we strengthened their preferences on purpose to measure their effect. When agents aren’t given clear preferences and instructions to voice them, the effect might be smaller.

This isn’t a simple cautionary tale against working with AI. Analysts who used the agent finished the task faster and made far fewer serious errors than those who chose to work without it, although the latter group was small and less experienced, so we are wary of reading too much into it. But as AI takes over more of the hands-on work, decisions like these are increasingly where human judgment and values will affect the result. If experts defer to agents without realizing it, the agents’ preferences—which could be arbitrary or misaligned—could shape important decisions about policy proposals or research directions without anyone having chosen those preferences. This is particularly important for research into keeping AI safe. Researchers have begun using agents to run and analyze experiments and a human reviewer is only an independent check if their judgment is their own.

We recruited 61 analysts for a randomized controlled trial. All came from a pre-screened pool of professionals who had passed a causal-inference knowledge check, used the programming languages Python or R regularly, and had hands-on experience with observational causal analysis, which means studying cause and effect using real-world data rather than a controlled experiment.

The task was set at a fictional organization, the Greenfields Farming Cooperative, which runs an (equally fictitious) voluntary, paid advisory program to help its member farms improve their crop yields. About 40% of members have enrolled. The co-op’s board must decide whether to subsidize and expand the program, or discontinue it. The board will expand the program only if it improves farms’ productivity by a set margin, roughly 3–4%, but it doesn’t say exactly how productivity should be measured.

We deliberately left four analytical decisions open, each with two reasonable options:

These four choices led into a final recommendation: whether to roll out the program to everyone, or to discontinue it. Analysts and agents could also propose a one-year extension.

Each of the analytical decisions could move the estimated productivity gain by several percentage points, which is important when the board’s threshold is 3–4%.

For each of the five decisions presented to each analyst, the agent’s lean was set by a coin flip. We gave the agent its leans in hidden instructions (a system prompt) that told it to hold each lean as its own view, to raise it when the decision came up, and to make the strongest case for it that the data allowed. The same instructions told it to change its mind if the evidence turned decisively against it, and never to misrepresent results, hide data, or make an argument the numbers didn’t support.

Out of 61 participants, 11 chose not to use the agent and are left out of the analysis unless noted. Among the remaining 50, 65% held a master’s or doctorate or had six or more years of experience, and 90% rated themselves proficient or expert in observational causal inference (of the 48 who answered the survey). The median time on the task was 65 minutes, and half of the analysts took between 50 and 79 minutes. They worked in a web-based version of the VS Code editor with Claude Code built in, running Claude Opus 4.8 at High effort.

When they finished, analysts submitted their four analytical choices and their final recommendation alongside an estimate of the program’s effect on productivity, with a confidence interval. They then completed a post-task survey. A separate AI model read each submission and its code to record which option the analyst had chosen on each decision. Where its reading disagreed with the analyst’s own survey answer, we made the final call.

Analysts mostly went with their agents’ lean. On each of the four analytical decisions, analysts’ choices matched their agents’ lean the large majority of the time: 92% for the outcome measure, 82% for the comparison method, 81% for which farms the estimate covered, and 90% for weighting. Across all four combined, the result was 86%. Figure 2 shows how much the agents’ lean shifted analysts’ choices on each decision, including the final recommendation.

Agents’ lean had a weaker effect on the final recommendation, but its earlier input still shaped the result. When the agent leaned toward rolling out the program, 54% of analysts recommended it, compared with 36% when it leaned the other way. (A one-year extension counts as not rolling out.) We think the effect was weaker because, once the analysts had their estimate, the recommendation largely followed from whether it cleared the board’s 3–4% threshold, which left less room for judgment. But by then, an agent’s lean on the analytical decisions had already shaped the estimate itself. Using only those four leans, a statistical model correctly predicted 82% of the analysts’ recommendations, compared with 61% for always guessing the most common recommendation. (This excludes analysts who proposed an extension.) So we could largely predict what an analyst would recommend from the coin flips alone, before they had even started the task.

Analysts who had already picked an option often switched when their agent disagreed. In 38 cases, an analyst had expressed a preference on one of the analytical decisions before the agent expressed its lean. When the lean went against their choice, they switched 60% of the time, compared with 6% when it agreed with their choice. That’s a gap of 54 percentage points, but because this rests on only 38 cases, the estimate is imprecise, and the 95% confidence interval runs from 24 to 82 percentage points. We also can’t be sure that the difference is caused by the AI’s influence: the analysts who expressed a preference may have been systematically different in some way from those who didn’t.

Experience and expertise did not predict who deferred. In an exploratory analysis, we checked whether any of 10 characteristics predicted how often analysts’ decisions followed their agents’ lean: years of experience, self-rated expertise in causal inference, education, score on a causal-inference quiz, trust in AI, how often they used AI, “need for cognition” (a measure of how much people enjoy effortful thinking), open-mindedness, gender, and age. Only age showed a statistically significant link, with older analysts following the lean more often. But we don’t read very much into that: if you test many different things, you’re more likely to get one positive result just by chance, and when we adjusted for that the result disappeared. Because most analysts followed their agent on most decisions, there was little variation to explain anyway, so even real differences would have been hard to detect.

Analysts who followed their agent’s lean still called the recommendation their own. On the post-task survey, 52% of analysts rated the final recommendation as more their own than their agent’s. The rest said it was more the agent’s recommendation. But both groups were roughly equally influenced by their agents: the former’s choices shifted about 65 percentage points toward their agents’ lean, on average, compared to 79 percentage points for the latter, a difference within the margin of error. Analysts’ confidence in their own recommendation showed a similar pattern. They were asked to rate their confidence from 0 (“it’s a coin flip”) to 100 (“I’d stake my professional reputation on it”). Those who followed the lean on all four analytical decisions averaged 71, compared to 73 for the rest.

Analysts explained their choices in their agent’s words. After the task, the survey asked about each decision: “Briefly, why that choice rather than the alternative? If it wasn’t an active choice, just say so.” Analysts couldn’t look back at their conversations with the agent while answering. Even so, 77% repeated their agent’s argument in at least one answer, sometimes word for word, and only 15% credited the agent anywhere.

When explicitly asked what they thought the study was about, six of the 48 correctly guessed that it was about the AI’s influence on their choices, but none suspected that the AI’s own preferences had been manipulated.

Analysts who worked without AI made more serious errors and took longer. Of the 11 participants who chose not to use the agent, six (55%) made serious methodological errors that invalidated their results, compared with three of the 50 (6%) who did use it. Two AI models flagged the errors, and one of the study’s authors checked each one without knowing which group the analyst was in. The analysts who worked without an agent also took longer, with a median time of 90 minutes, compared to 65 for the others.

The two groups were not directly comparable, so we can’t be sure whether the different outcomes were caused by the decision to use or not use AI. Those who worked without AI were less experienced on average: fewer held a master’s degree or a doctorate (four out of 11, compared to 24 out of 46 who used the agent), more had two years or less in analysis roles (six out of 11, compared to 15 out of 48), and fewer rated themselves proficient or expert in causal inference (eight of 11, compared to 43 out

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