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Russian Bot Activity Collapses by 84% After Strikes on Yandex Data Centers

The Center for Countering Disinformation (hereinafter referred to as the Center) conducted an in-depth study of accounts displaying signs of inauthentic behavior to identify changes in their activity following attacks o…

Hacker News 最新DeepLogin2026/10/18 · 2026/10/1819 分钟阅读

以下正文同步自 Hacker News 最新,版权归原站所有,已转换为易读排版。

The Center for Countering Disinformation (hereinafter referred to as the Center) conducted an in-depth study of accounts displaying signs of inauthentic behavior to identify changes in their activity following attacks on ‘Yandex’ data centers in russia. The study covers 26 topics within the Ukrainian segment of the information environment during the period of 6-12 October, 2026.

According to open-source information, on October 8, 2026, following an attack and subsequent fire, a ‘Yandex’ data center in sasovo, ryazan region, russia, which housed two of the company’s three supercomputers, ceased operations completely. On October 9, 2026, a strike on another ‘Yandex’ data center in kaluga, kaluga region, russia, disabled part of its infrastructure. During the night of October 11, 2026, a third ‘Yandex’ data center, located in vladimir, vladimir region, russia, was attacked; its operations were also fully halted.

Following the complete shutdown of the facilities in sasovo and vladimir, two sharp declines in the activity of accounts displaying signs of inauthentic behavior were recorded – on October 8 and October 12, 2026. The number of messages recovered between these dates and exceeded the level recorded before the first attack.

The data were collected using Osavul software, which flagged the analyzed accounts as displaying signs of inauthentic behavior. The analysis covers Facebook and Telegram – the platforms with the highest volume of recorded activity. All indicators refer exclusively to these two platforms. The analysis first examined the overall activity of the accounts and then focused on the activity of the group that disseminated destructive content.

Duplicate messages across topics were removed, and dates were determined according to Kyiv time. An account was considered active on a given day if it published at least one message. Daily changes were calculated relative to the previous day.

Overall Activity of the Analyzed Accounts

Over the seven-day period, 22 664 messages were recorded from 5 201 accounts displaying signs of inauthentic behavior. Of these, 14 058 messages were published on Facebook, accounting for 62.0% of the total volume, while 8 606 messages were published on Telegram, or 38.0%.

On October 8, 2026, the number of messages fell from 4 032 to 660 – a decrease of 83.6%. At the same time, the number of active accounts dropped from 1 526 to 258 – by 83.1%. The decline affected both platforms but was more pronounced on Telegram: 90.0%, compared with 79.5% on Facebook.

By October 9, 2026, activity had begun to recover: the number of messages increased to 2 231, rising further to 4 585 on October 10 and 4 711 on October 11. Thus, no new daily decline was recorded following the partial damage to the data center in kaluga. By contrast, on October 12, 2026, the day after the complete shutdown of the facility in vladimir, the volume of messages fell to 2 704 – a decrease of 42.6%. The number of active accounts also declined by 41.0%, from 1 976 to 1 166.

Compared with October 8, 2026, the magnitude of the decline on October 12, 2026 was similar across both platforms: 43.1% on Facebook and 41.9% on Telegram. In both cases, both the number of messages and the number of active accounts decreased.

Activity of Accounts That Disseminated Destructive Content

From the overall sample, 98 accounts were identified whose publications contained justification of russian aggression, conspiracy claims, incitement to hostility, or calls for violence. During the analysed period, these accounts published 1 349 messages: 1 059 on Facebook (78.5%) and 290 on Telegram (21.5%).

For this group, all recorded activity, including neutral posts, was analysed to track changes in the behavior of accounts that disseminated destructive content. The figures therefore do not represent exclusively destructive publications.

On October 8, 2026, the number of messages published by this group fell from 198 to 44 – a decrease of 77.8% – while the number of active accounts dropped from 33 to 7, or by 78.8%. The decline affected both platforms: message volume decreased by 78.9% on Facebook and by 75.0% on Telegram.

On October 9, 2026, these accounts published 120 messages, followed by 241 on October 10 and 313 on October 11, exceeding the level recorded on October 7. A second decline was recorded on October 12, 2026: the number of messages fell to 159 – by 49.2%, while the number of active accounts decreased from 53 to 36, or by 32.1%.

On October 12, 2026, the decline within the selected group was more significant on Telegram, at 66.7%, compared with 43.7% on Facebook. Thus, both episodes of reduced activity were observed not only across the overall sample but also among accounts that disseminated destructive content.

Messages concerning the war and peace negotiations included claims about a ‘staged war.’ They also alleged that the Ukrainian authorities were deliberately eliminating Ukrainians and that Ukraine and its partners were interested in prolonging the hostilities for profit. Such messages shifted responsibility for the war away from russia and onto the Ukrainian leadership and Western countries.

Another group of posts sought to undermine trust in state institutions and deepen social divisions. The Ukrainian authorities were described as ‘occupational’ or ‘illegitimate,’ while conspiracy claims based on ethnic and religious themes were also disseminated. Some messages contained direct calls for violence against government officials, military personnel, law enforcement officers, and their families.

In the energy-related narratives, power outages were attributed to the alleged deliberate sale of electricity abroad, while the impact of infrastructure damage was denied. Some messages also claimed that Ukrainian air defense deliberately intercepts russian missiles and drones over residential buildings. In this way, responsibility for the consequences of russian strikes was shifted from the aggressor state onto the Ukrainian authorities and the Defense Forces of Ukraine.

Posts justifying russian aggression portrayed russian strikes as a ‘response’ to Ukraine’s actions and the temporary occupation of Ukrainian territories as ‘liberation.’ Claims were also spread that Ukraine is under external control and had itself provoked the war. At the same time, identical or nearly identical texts repeatedly appeared across different messages.

Following the attacks that resulted in the complete shutdown of ‘Yandex’ data centers in sasovo and vladimir, two sharp declines in activity among the analyzed accounts were recorded on Facebook and Telegram. On October 8, 2026, the overall volume of messages decreased by 83.6%, and on October 12, 2026, by 42.6%. In both cases, the number of active accounts also declined. The same pattern – decline, recovery, and a second decline – was observed among accounts that disseminated destructive content.

The first decline was short-lived: by October 10-11, 2026, the number of messages had exceeded the level recorded on October 7. No new decline followed the partial damage to the data center in kaluga on October 9, 2026. The more limited extent of the damage may have reduced the impact of the attack on network operations. By contrast, activity dropped sharply again following the complete shutdown of the facility in vladimir.

The observed dynamics indicate that strikes on data centers can significantly constrain the dissemination of russian information influence by disrupting automated networks. At the same time, the rapid recovery in activity suggests that such an impact may be substantial but short-lived.

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