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Commentary: Cory Doctorow: Technopolitics

It’s one thing to be “anti-AI” in the sense of believing that AI-generated slop, disinformation and deepfakes are bad; that AI companies that hope to con your boss into firing you and replacing you with AI that can’t do…

Hacker News 最新cdrnsf2026/10/20 · 26 天前30 分钟阅读

以下正文同步自 Hacker News 最新,版权归原站所有,已转换为易读排版。

It’s one thing to be “anti-AI” in the sense of believing that AI-generated slop, disinformation and deepfakes are bad; that AI companies that hope to con your boss into firing you and replacing you with AI that can’t do your job are bad; that betting the economy on AI is bad; that betting the human-habitable planet Earth on AI is bad; that running roughshod over local environmental rules and seizing farmland for data centers is bad. Those are all good reasons to be “anti-AI.”

But being “anti-AI” in the sense of “opposing the statistical inference techniques we call AI” is weird. So is being anti-AI in the sense of “opposing the use of models that were created using large language corpuses because it’s inherently wrong to compute the frequency with which words occur in writ­ten language.” And it’s also weird to be anti-AI in the sense of “opposing AI because someone, somewhere used AI in a way that was gross, harmful or exploitative.”

Today, the two kinds of “anti-AI” are mostly a distinction without a difference, because nearly all the world’s AI output comes from one of the “frontier models” made by a giant AI company. No matter why you oppose AI, you probably don’t like those frontier models.

But after the AI bubble bursts, the distinction will be much sharper. Long after the collapse of the seven AI companies that make up 35% of the S&P 500 stop trading the same $100 billion IOU around really fast while pretending it’s in all their bank accounts at once, there will still be cheap bankruptcy-sale hardware, legions of unemployed skilled AI workers, and the open-source models released by today’s AI giants will still run, and will continue to be improved by the people who rely on them.

The useful things AI does will keep happening. You’ll still be able to prompt up a single-serving, personal piece of software to perform one task with moderate reliability for your use, and when it stops working, you’ll be able to do it again. You’ll still be able to transcribe audio, or summarize a document. You’ll still be able to use a chatbot as an interactive journal, or as a supercharged spellchecker.

None of that will change – and neither will the limits on all those activities. If you don’t know enough about a document or its subject to spot obvious errors in an AI summary, you’ll be periodically misled. If you’re so desperate or uninformed that you trust summaries you lack the capacity to evaluate in critical situations, you may be led to disaster. If you don’t know anything about computers and you turn a piece of vibe-coded software loose on your machine, you might delete something important, or irreversibly expose sensitive data to the public internet.

AI isn’t exceptional, it’s normal. It’s not exceptionally dangerous. It’s not exceptionally evil. It’s also not exceptionally useful or exceptionally good. AI represents a significant advance to computer science – a moderate variation to existing machine learning techniques that generated a much larger improvement in those techniques.

In the absence of the AI investment bubble, we’d call the things AI can do “plug-ins” – as in, “I just got a new plug-in for my word processor that generates plausible word salads. I can see how that might be useful for generating placeholder text, and I can tell that a lot of people are going to use it in ways I find supremely annoying.” I’ve had a lot of plug-ins for my word processors over the past 40 years, and most of them fit that description. None of them ever made me want to bet the global economy on it, or to feed all the writers into a woodchipper.

AI can do many useful things. Some of them are very useful: Friends who work in advanced statistics tell me that AI coding assistants help them produce high-quality, reliable code that solves real problems, improving the quality of the work they do. I find AI-generated transcripts of audio very useful for locating quotes in podcasts I’ve recently listened to, and I use a chatbot that runs on my computer to check my essays for typos. This bot often catches typos that my text editor’s checker misses, among a smattering of false positives that I have the experience and discernment to disregard (you know, like every spell checker).

But AI doesn’t exist in the absence of the bubble – it very much exists in the white-hot center of the most dangerous investment bubble in the history of markets. A year ago, the AI sector’s total expenditures were about $700b. Today, they’re over $1.4t, and Gartner projects that will rise to $2.4t by the end of the year. This is an astonishing sum of money to commit to a sector that grosses a mere $50b worldwide, annually. The sector’s failure to produce anywhere near as much value as it is consuming has not dimmed its backers’ ardor, and they are committed to spending, and spending, and spending, until either they run out of investors or they somehow transform $50b worth of revenue on $2.4t in expenditures into profit.

To this end, the sector’s masters are committing all manner of unforgivable sins. These range from conning your boss into firing you and replacing you with an AI that can’t do your job; to convincing your town council to seize your home and build a data center, without any environmental review or public input; to swindling everyday savers with nonsensical IPOs and sweetheart deals with stock exchanges that let insiders cash out their stupid AI bets with your retirement savings.

These sins are baked into this kind of AI production. There is no way to raise trillions in subsidies that allow AI companies to sell computation at a subsidy that amounts to selling $100 bills for $1 each without also insisting that the end state of all of this is that every job will be swallowed by a chatbot. You can’t raise trillions on this promise with­out “blitzscaled” data-centers – accompanied by climate-shredding gas turbines. You can’t raise trillions without cramming AI into every part of every person’s digital life, without any safeguards for how vulnerable people might use them to sink deep into dangerous delusion.

These are the “technopolitics” of AI: To make this AI, the people in­volved had to inflict all these harms upon us. The important questions are: to what extent are these the necessary technopolitics of AI, and; can those technopolitics change?

Langdon Winner’s 1980 article, “Do Artifacts Have Politics?” is the Ur-text for questions like these. In this seminal essay, the rock critic turned tech scholar Winner demands that we move beyond the simple framing of tech having “intended” and “unintended” consequences, and instead insists that politics come baked into some technologies.

Winner divides the politics of technology into two broad categories: politics that are derived from the specific way that a technology has been introduced into the world; and politics that are either necessitated by, or strongly compatible with a technology by dint of its technical char­acteristics.

For the first category – objects whose politics are determined by de­ployment decisions – Winner cites a set of notorious Long Island freeway overpasses. These were specified by Robert Moses, and in The Power Broker, Robert A. Caro’s seminal biography of Moses, we learn that Moses delib­erately chose to make these overpasses too low for a bus to pass beneath, in order to prevent a public transit route from being established between New York’s Black neighborhoods and Long Island’s public beaches, favored by the white bourgeoisie.

According to Winner, a freeway overpass isn’t necessarily political, but these overpasses are. What’s more, their politics is durable, outlasting Robert Moses’s tenure as New York’s most powerful political figure, even outliving Moses himself.

For the second category – technologies whose politics emerge from their intrinsic technical characteristics – Winner compares solar and nuclear power. Nuclear reactors, he argues, require a central authority to build, operate, and maintain (we might add here that they also require a con­stant stream of fissiles that can be extracted only from certain unevenly distributed mining sites). By contrast, solar can be installed anywhere the sun shines, established and overseen by small, decentralized groups. For Winner, nukes are irreducibly the tech of large, centralized states; while solar is potentially the tech of autonomous, nonhierarchical societies.

Between these two technological poles, Winner discusses a third ex­ample: a tomato harvester. The harvester enabled farmers to fire many of their pickers, giving power to bosses at the expense of workers. At the same time, the harvester only worked with hardier varietals that traded flavor for durability, yielding a cheaper, worse kind of tomato that drove out competing tomatoes that tasted better but cost more to raise because their cultivation wasn’t as amenable to cost-saving automation. The tomato harvester wasn’t created to weaken labor and worsen tomatoes, but that was its effect, and so the politics of this harvester included a certain kind of farm, a certain kind of labor relation, and a certain kind of foodway.

AI certainly has technopolitics. At a mini­mum, AI has the technopolitics of the first kind, those Robert Moses bridges. It has been capitalized specifically on the basis that it can be used to erode workers’ wages and labor power and to foist inferior goods on the public. There is no other way that the AI sector’s unimaginably vast capital losses can be turned into profits. The sums involved are so large that virtually everything everyone does, all the time, will need to be replaced with AI, and so it is also in AI’s technopolitics that AI must be crammed into every activity we undertake, whether or not it belongs there, and whether or not it presents a danger to the user, or to the people who depend on the user’s work (think here of cramming AI into automated systems for generating criminal accusations, which then prompt the police to make false arrests).

Now, none of this is intrinsic to the technolo­gy. Remember, the technology we’ve been calling “AI” for the past decade is a set of small varia­tions on existing machine learning techniques that yielded surprisingly large dividends relative to the size of those variations. This improvement was scalable – meaning that when computer scientists pushed these variations harder, they got concomitantly outsized improvements in the machine learning systems’ performance. This is one of the best kinds of technological breakthrough to be in the midst of, one where you discover a piece of low-hanging fruit that turns out to be at the edge of a whole orchard full of similarly low-hanging fruits.

There’s nothing technical about the discovery of this variation on machine learning that dic­tates the current AI approach. In an alternate universe, “AI” could be a $100b joint supercom­puting effort between the International Panel on Climate Change and Sandia National Labs, used to improve the fidelity of our climate models. This, too, would produce carbon emissions, but not nearly as many, and of course, everything people do has an impact on the environment (the only way to stop impacting the environment is to a) die; and b) decompose). This alternate uni­verse might also see a proliferation of hobbyist open source / open weight models spinning out of these efforts, with online forums and social media filled with generated text and sounds and images. As with every technology controlled by its users, some users will find ways to sin against the law and ethics. There will be some gross stuff around the edge (voice cloning for fraud, deepfake porn, etc), but for the public, the main AI event would be a bunch of plug-ins that were byproducts of a big public research project. The crimes and sins of AI will become a matter for social and legal control – not problems that we can only solve if we can convince vast, corrupt, wealthy corporations to take action.

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