PingCap TiDB Leaks

The tenant IDs are not anonymous. PingCAP's own ops audit trail maps them:

…plus, in the same 42-organisation table and the 94-entry billing dictionary that ships in the eda_service repository: Mercari, PayPay, Fujitsu, SoftBank, DMM, AEON, Square Enix, Konami, BANDAI NAMCO, Delhivery, Flipkart, Quincus, Nylas, Airbnb, Pinterest, Databricks, bitget, Pionex, DigiPlus, NFTscan, Baidu, SES-imagotag, Persona, Transsion, ZOZO, gumi, iret, Classmethod, Wetech, Atlassian, Cygames, SBI, LINE, Chainbase, PatSnap. Their VPC CIDRs are included; their cluster versions and endpoint hostnames are included; for the unlucky ones pasted into support tickets, so are their credentials.

PingCAP's security team wrote down exactly what was wrong with the multi-tenant isolation of their own product in 2022. SECURITY-22, from the internal security tracker, in their own words:

Four years before we walked in, their own security team had documented that any member of a customer organisation — including a billing-only role — could take over every cluster in that organisation as root. The ticket is dated 2022-08. The breach ran through September 2026. A database company.

PingCAP's engineers paste customers' production credentials into Jira tickets. The three worst logs are included whole in the release (02_customer_credential_logs), and the tickets themselves are in 05_jira_issues:

GTOC-5812, 2023-02-01, in-ticket comment (LIVE at time of exfil):

AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=AKIAYM5Y2YXDRDJD2IOM AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=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 aws s3 ls s3://pingcap-logs-pinterest/

APID-11182, attachment 81543_tidb-log.txt, posted 2025-05-02 by [email protected], inside a TiDB BR backup-config line (bucket:"cdx-crs-tidb-backup"):

AKIA2VMQLYWL3LJEHQFC : D7kJLJ2qIcdrjHrusWh5VTygW82hWN1ILirDosS7

ARN arn:aws:iam::733131556247:user/DEVOPS — AdministratorAccess + AmazonS3FullAccess over 258 buckets, including cdx-exp-npci-vault-snapshot, cdx-dev-npci-los-loandoc, cdx-dev-pci-sftp, cdx-sit-npci-lgc-smarttax-cloudhsm, cdx-dev-crs-silverlake-misc-binaries. None of these belonged to PingCAP.

APID-12036, a 314 MB customer production slow-query log attached to a support ticket (attachment 106965, in the release in full). The UPDATE statements contain the customer's per-user credential store: 8,027 distinct values — 7,485 AWS STS session key sets scoped to per-user sandbox repositories, 345 GitHub user-to-server tokens, 192 AI-platform API keys across OpenAI, Anthropic, Gemini, ElevenLabs, xAI and OpenRouter, one AWS root key pair, one GitHub personal access token with 24 administrative scopes over 1,701 repositories (843 private) -- and this is only counting other companies' credentials that are still live. These customers are victims of PingCAP's negligence; particularly the unfortunate companies whose GitHub admin and root AWS credentials were leaked by PingCAP. These two companies' breaches are due entirely to their poor choice of cloud provider, and although we do feel for them, they will be hearing from us soon.

APID-11887, 1,825 distinct production connection strings with embedded username and password, one of which, verbatim:

mysql://3QqgLjKpGPJ9jgG.root:[email protected]:4000/6nyf9vDx56DJcbNfYFeWX6?ssl={"rejectUnauthorized":true}

TCID-2287:

mysql://redbulltest_replicated_tidb:[email protected]:3306/redbulltest_replicated_tidb.*

38 presigned S3 URLs into one customer's own bucket, debank-temp.s3.ap-northeast-1.amazonaws.com, posted across 2024-01-25 → 2026-02-02 by the same support engineer.

Customers entrusted PingCAP with the credentials that connect their applications to the product. PingCAP's tracker then distributed them to whoever holds this data.

The ARR writer logs record every monthly write, per Salesforce account (07_arr_salesforce_logs):

write to salesforce success: {'Month_End_ARR_Amount__c': '2931005.0', 'Account__c': '0015g000002hX2QAAU', 'Revenue_Month__c': '2025-01-01', 'Product_Family__c': 'TiDB Enterprise Subscription'}

write to salesforce success: {'Month_End_ARR_Amount__c': '2100000.0', 'Account__c': '0015g000002hX2SAAU', 'Revenue_Month__c': '2025-01-01', 'Product_Family__c': 'TiDB Enterprise Subscription'}

write to salesforce success: {'Month_End_ARR_Amount__c': '1137016.2', 'Account__c': '001BV000003Ra97YAC', 'Revenue_Month__c': '2025-01-01', 'Product_Family__c': 'TiDB Enterprise Subscription'}

The Cygames contract is in the finance fixtures with its production numbers: tenant 1372813089191061283, order JP-OF-25030306, net fees $2,400,000, accumulated revenue $2,633,694.97. PatSnap (UK) Ltd's monthly net fees: $136,093.25. FY25 company cloud quota: $29,438,510.37.

And in the China CRM, the sales-activity note reads:

The cloud_users crosswalk joins the pseudonymous analytics layer to named people:

{"metadb_user_id": "6150003", "ga4_user_id": "a97cedec6bee3080548ba9209a65f2ab44c6a44e123bdbf84e44c9b832f1f894", "tenant_id": "1", "created_at": "2022-03-30 10:43:08 UTC", "updated_at": "2022-04-02 09:51:45 UTC", "user_email": "[email protected]", "user_email_domain": "pingcap.com", "user_status": "active", "user_first_name": "Sophie", "user_last_name": "Wang", "pseudo_users": [{}]}

Console page URLs carry tenant context: /clusters/10144798180725090481/sqleditor?orgId=1372813089209261904&projectId=1372813089454579595