
AI Had Better Work Out
Friday’s piece will be the Hater's Guide to Blackstone — one of the most loathsome companies in existence, and one that’s staked its entire existence on the AI bubble.
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Friday’s piece will be the Hater's Guide to Blackstone — one of the most loathsome companies in existence, and one that’s staked its entire existence on the AI bubble.
If you want to get in touch — and especially if you have any juicy information about Anthropic, OpenAI, Blackstone or any other companies in the AI bubble — hit me up on Signal at ezitron.76. I’m also on IB on your Bloomberg Terminal.
Soundtrack: Royal Blood — Pull Me Through
At the end of July, Apollo Chief Economist Torsten Slok gave a blunt warning to the Washington Post:
Today, I’m going to quantify exactly how difficult it will be for the “AI thing” to “work out.”
The theoreticals and hypotheticals of this industry are so powerful that they’ve created one of the (if not the) largest equities bubbles in modern history, all heavily-centralized around the valuations of a handful of names related to the so-called AI trade, which translates to “buying or selling stuff to do with AI GPUs.”
This has led to the single-highest inflow of foreign investments into US equities in history — larger than the Dot-Com Bubble, the leadup to the Great Financial Crisis, and even the dying gasps of the Zero Interest Free Era in 2021, per Apollo:
However you might hand-wave away the AI bubble’s economic issues by saying it’s “just like the Dot-Com Bubble” — when the NASDAQ 100 fell 77% from its peak — the consequences are now global, at a scale unseen in history, flowing into both direct stocks and indices.
As of typing this sentence, NVIDIA alone makes up 11.31% of the NASDAQ 100, with the combined weight of NVIDIA, Google, Amazon, Meta, Microsoft, Broadcom, Micron, AMD and CoreWeave representing about 46.5% of the index’s value, or 39.3% of the entire 3000-company NASDAQ composite.
These same names — replacing CoreWeave with Oracle — represent around 28.9% of the value of the S&P 500.
To sustain the valuation of these stocks — let alone continue growing — will require every company involved to either spend or make hundreds of billions of dollars in perpetuity, increasing every single quarter, without fail. This will come from either selling ever-increasing amounts of AI chips and related hardware, or buying and using them to generate revenue either through rentals or building their own software products.
While the centralization was more severe at the top of the Dot-Com era NASDAQ — with Cisco, Intel and Microsoft accounting for roughly 74% — the total value of the index was a mere $1.82 trillion ($3.58 trillion adjusted for inflation).
Today’s top three — NVIDIA, Google and Microsoft — account for around 29% of the NASDAQ 100, for a total market capitalization of $13.5 trillion.
Per Goldman Sachs (via Reuters), "...equity gains have been the dominant driver of household wealth accumulation and the main contributor to a positive wealth effect on consumer spending," and per data from the Fed, corporate equities accounted for 37.9% of all household wealth in Q2 2026, the highest number on record since Q4 2000.
Economist Paul Kedrosky told me it might actually be higher:
While the Fed’s data only goes back to Q4 2000, corporate equities as a share of household wealth only sat at 25.9% ($11.5 trillion, or $22.7 trillion adjusted for inflation), back at a time when total household wealth sat at $44.4 trillion, or about $85.2 trillion in today’s money. In Q2 2026, total household wealth sits at about $195.8 trillion, with corporate equities sitting at roughly $74 trillion, or roughly 86.8% of the entire US household wealth 26 years ago.
Retails are also making up an historically-large amount of the volume of trades on the market, per Bloomberg Intelligence, making up 20.3% of trading in 2026 to date, approaching the dangerous heights of the worst excesses of the end of the Zero Interest Rate Policy era.
Retail investors also directly own about 29% of Amazon’s, 26.2% of NVIDIA’s, 22.6% of AMD’s, 21.8% of Microsoft’s, and 18.6% of Meta’s stocks, though these numbers are not inclusive of index funds like SPY or QQQ (a fund tied to the NASDAQ). In totality, retail investors own equity assets (at least as of May) equivalent to about 10% of the market.
In fact, Goldman Sachs had retail volumes significantly higher:
By comparison, Dot-Com era retail trading was much, much lower — less than 2% of the NYSE’s trading volume according to the University of Michigan’s Alicia J. Davis in a paper that begins with the phrase “the American retail investor is dying.”
When all of this is over, I think retail investors might wish they were dead, as they directly own somewhere in the region of $4.65 trillion worth of NVIDIA, Amazon, Microsoft, Google, Meta, Broadcom, AMD, Micron, Oracle, and CoreWeave stocks. The number is likely much smaller than the true exposure retail investors have, as it isn’t inclusive of investments in index funds.
On April 14, 2000, the NASDAQ composite dropped 9.67% and the S&P 500 5.78%, with a little under 97% of the S&P 500 constituents falling on the day, per TIME and The Washington Post, led by hot inflation numbers and overall anxiety over the tech sector’s valuations:
Yet the Post had one telling quote, emphasis mine:
While it seems unlikely, a drop of around 20% across NVIDIA, Amazon, Google, Meta, Broadcom, AMD, Oracle, Micron, and CoreWeave would have the same effect as the entire market downturn on the worst day of the Dot-Com Bubble crash.
In truth, it wouldn’t even have to be that bad.
Per CNN Moneyline News Hour transcript from April 14, 2000, Qualcomm fell 21%, Yahoo fell 20%, Intel a little over 10%, and Microsoft a mere 5% — and that’s all it took to make the market bottom out.
Brief NVIDIA selloffs have already caused big market declines:
Anyway, remember that quote about momentum investing, overvaluations and growth? Here’s a quote from Bloomberg from last week (October 14), emphasis mine:
And here’s another quote from CNN from a day later, emphasis mine:
History may not repeat, but it rhymes. Every problem that burst the Dot-Com Bubble is here, but it’s worse, bigger and uglier, with global contagion risk that I basically never see discussed.
For example, the ongoing equity price of TSMC on the Taiwanese Stock Exchange makes up about 40% of the entire market, with the ODMs that have seen booming earnings making AI servers for hyperscalers representing another 3% or so. On The Tokyo Stock Exchange, the combined weight of SoftBank, RAM maker Kioxia, and the two major banks (SMBC and MUFG) backing AI data centers make up approximately 11.24% of the TOPIX Index. Samsung and SK Hynix, both of whom have seen remarkable RAM sales (see my Hater’s Guide To The Memory Crisis for more), make up more than 50% of the entire value of Korea’s KOSPI.
Their elevated valuations come from a belief that they’ll grow in perpetuity, much like the American markets.
And let’s be clear about something: all it takes is the vibe souring to the point that people lose faith in the AI trade for everything to start to collapse.
So, what will it take to keep the party going?
The answer is simple: perpetual, parabolic growth in both AI revenues and AI capex.
Per CNBC, well, exactly what I’ve been saying, emphasis mine:
Are…are you sure about that? Isn’t AI the biggest, most hugest thing ever? It’s transformative! It’ll change everything! Aren’t we all excited-
Okay, well, check out Doctor Doom over here, I bet he’s gonna be so surprised when those profitable returns come in-
Well, at least there’s a diverse revenue base for GPU sales-OH MY GOD!
NVIDIA has guided to a 70% increase in its next fiscal year — I assume FY2028, starting February 2027 — or over $670 billion in annual revenue, over three times its FY 2026 sales, with said sales dependent on whether Microsoft, Google, Amazon, Oracle, Meta, SpaceX (who collectively make up 50% to 60% of NVIDIA’s data center revenues), and the various neoclouds like CoreWeave, Nebius, and Nscale keep buying more of them every quarter, or at the very least that a willing vessel can step in to pick up the slack if they stop. If demand wavers, NVIDIA, Broadcom, Micron, AMD, and any associated silicon or hardware counterparties will see their revenue growth stumble, which will have a brutal knock-on effect on their stocks.
NVIDIA already has its own revenue concentration problem — 44% of its first half FY2027 revenues came from three customers, and in Q2 FY2027, 70% of its accounts receivables were from three customers, with 16% of its revenues coming from one. One. How is this not more worrying to people?
Anyway, to buy those GPUs (or TPUs, in Broadcom’s case), everyone outside of Microsoft will have to raise tens of billions of dollars of debt at a time when underlying interest rates are growing and the overall debt markets have chilled around AI data center debt.
Said chill comes from the world finally waking up to what I said in March 2025 — that CoreWeave is a time bomb of expensive debt that’s now selling off as people realize that making any of its supposed $104 billion in backlog (at least 50% of which is OpenAI and Anthropic) will require, per UBS, about $102 billion in debt in the next three years. CoreWeave’s long-dated bonds (by which I mean maturing in 2031) had an effective yield of as much as 16% in the last week.
With endless delays and hundreds of billions of dollars of chips sitting in storage, AI data centers have dramatically turned from the panacea for all infrastructure investment to fixed-income nightmare fuel. For whatever reason, nobody thought that lending hundreds of billions of dollars to a selection of different dodgy SPVs and neoclouds to build the world’s most ambitious infrastructure projects was a problem until, well, everybody, per the WSJ:
Per the Journal, this debt heavily relies on both the continued value of the data center and critical IT gear and whether the bloody thing actually gets built:
In other words, the value of that data center debt is heavily contingent on whether the underlying assets retain their value, which in turn is contingent on whether there are customers that exist. For whatever reason, nobody wants to consider the most obvious problem: that if one customer can’t pay, other customers can’t pay, and if other customers can’t pay, there’s going to be less demand for AI data centers in general, which means there will be a glut of data center infrastructure, which will mean those assets you intend to resell if everything goes poorly won’t be worth as much.
I sure hope that financial institutions have a plan…
Oh okay, the problem with overly-expensive AI data center debt is simply that the markets will feel better when the underlying data centers (which are overwhelmingly delayed) get built? Awesome! It’s just that simple! I’m sure somebody out there will deal with the massive delays for the talent, materials and power connections necessary to complete them!
As of writing this sentence, CoreWeave’s bonds are trading somewhere between 14.1% and 15.1%, and the only way it can calm investor anxiety will be building AI data centers at a rate that has proven next to impossible.
Part of the problem is that recent pushes by smaller and somehow-dodgier neoclouds like Firmus (which just pulled its IPO) and Nscale (whose investors are pushing for it to nearly halve its IPO float to $16 billion and just lost Microsoft as a client due to power delays) have made investors intimately aware of the overpromises of AI data center companies.
Both Nscale and Firmus have the same customer concentration problems as CoreWeave, with 85% of Nscale’s backlog coming from Anthropic and Microsoft, and 90% of Firmus’ coming from Meta and OpenAI. Again, these are problems that CoreWeave, IREN and Nebius have had for years, but for whatever reason everybody has decided to wake up. Everybody has the same backlog customers — Microsoft (for OpenAI), Meta, OpenAI, Google (for Anthropic and OpenAI), Amazon (for Anthropic), and, of
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