No One Is Coming to Fix the Subsea Cables (March 2026)

Subsea internet cables carry 99 percent of transoceanic digital traffic.1Lynn Kuok, “The New Arteries of Power: Subsea Cables Are This Century’s Hidden Battleground,” Foreign Affairs, January 2, 2026, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/new-arteries-power.                Financial transactions, diplomatic communications, military data, and the mundane browsing of billions of people all travel through fiber-optic strands resting on the ocean floor. These cables require something that is in desperately short supply: international cooperation.

They need it for route surveys, installation permits, maintenance windows, and emergency repairs across dozens of jurisdictions. They need it when a cable is severed in waters controlled by a hostile government or a non-state militia. They need it when the only repair ship in the region cannot enter a conflict zone without a ceasefire that no one is willing to broker. The world is fracturing, and the infrastructure that holds the global internet together is fracturing with it.

The Red Sea was, until recently, the highway of the global internet. Roughly 95 percent of data traffic between Asia and Europe transited its waters.2Nadine Hawkins, “The End of the Red Sea Era: Why War and Politics Are Shattering a Global Digital Lifeline,” Capacity, March 16, 2026, https://capacityglobal.com/news/red-sea-internet-outage-geopolitical-crisis/.      The geography was compelling: shorter routes, lower latency, international waters with fewer regulatory obstacles. Egypt sat at the junction, drawing an estimated 10 percent of its national telecoms revenue from transit fees alone.2Nadine Hawkins, “The End of the Red Sea Era: Why War and Politics Are Shattering a Global Digital Lifeline,” Capacity, March 16, 2026, https://capacityglobal.com/news/red-sea-internet-outage-geopolitical-crisis/.

Then the Houthis started firing. Since late 2023, two major outage events have each severed four subsea cables simultaneously.2Nadine Hawkins, “The End of the Red Sea Era: Why War and Politics Are Shattering a Global Digital Lifeline,” Capacity, March 16, 2026, https://capacityglobal.com/news/red-sea-internet-outage-geopolitical-crisis/.      The first major outage in February 2024 took nearly six months to fix because no one could secure safe passage for repair vessels into Houthi-controlled waters.3Roderick Beck, “Capacity Media Interview of Me Regarding the Red Sea Cable Debacle and Solutions,” Subsea Cables & Internet Infrastructure, March 16, 2026, https://subseacables.blogspot.com/2026/03/capacity-media-interview-of-me.html.  As subsea cable consultant Roderick Beck put it, “the outages in themselves are not the problem. The problem is the inability to repair them in any reasonable length of time.”2Nadine Hawkins, “The End of the Red Sea Era: Why War and Politics Are Shattering a Global Digital Lifeline,” Capacity, March 16, 2026, https://capacityglobal.com/news/red-sea-internet-outage-geopolitical-crisis/.

The industry had barely begun to digest the Red Sea’s transformation from a commercial thoroughfare into a no-go zone when a second choke point closed. The U.S. led military campaign against Iran in early 2026 turned the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf into an active war zone.4Winston Qiu, “War in the Gulf Severs the World’s Digital Arteries: How the Iran Conflict Is Reshaping Global Connectivity,” Submarine Networks, March 15, 2026, https://www.submarinenetworks.com/en/nv/insights/war-in-the-gulf-severs-the-world-s-digital-arteries.           As Mr. Beck has noted, many subsea cable consortiums had viewed the Persian Gulf as their best hope for a Red Sea bypass route, only to discover that the Gulf is now possibly worse than the Red Sea.5Roderick Beck, “Subsea Cable Nightmares: Elm Street Comes to the Middle East,” Subsea Cables & Internet Infrastructure, March 14, 2026, https://subseacables.blogspot.com/2026/03/subsea-cable-nightmares-elm-street.html.   Alcatel Submarine Networks, the French state-owned company contracted to lay cable for Meta’s 2Africa Pearls extension, issued force majeure notices and halted all construction.6Annie Turner, “ASN Ceases Work on 2Africa Cable Citing Force Majeure,” Mobile Europe, March 18, 2026, https://www.mobileeurope.co.uk/asn-ceases-work-on-2africa-cable-citing-force-majeure/.  The cable-laying vessel Ile De Batz sits stranded off the coast of Dammam, Saudi Arabia, unable to complete its mission.4Winston Qiu, “War in the Gulf Severs the World’s Digital Arteries: How the Iran Conflict Is Reshaping Global Connectivity,” Submarine Networks, March 15, 2026, https://www.submarinenetworks.com/en/nv/insights/war-in-the-gulf-severs-the-world-s-digital-arteries.           A significant portion of the 2Africa Pearls cable has already been laid on the seabed but remains unconnected to its landing stations.4Winston Qiu, “War in the Gulf Severs the World’s Digital Arteries: How the Iran Conflict Is Reshaping Global Connectivity,” Submarine Networks, March 15, 2026, https://www.submarinenetworks.com/en/nv/insights/war-in-the-gulf-severs-the-world-s-digital-arteries.

The cascade extends well beyond 2Africa. SEA-ME-WE 6, originally scheduled for service in 2024 and already delayed to June 2027, faces further uncertainty.4Winston Qiu, “War in the Gulf Severs the World’s Digital Arteries: How the Iran Conflict Is Reshaping Global Connectivity,” Submarine Networks, March 15, 2026, https://www.submarinenetworks.com/en/nv/insights/war-in-the-gulf-severs-the-world-s-digital-arteries.           The cable’s bypass route runs up the Persian Gulf to Bahrain, then traverses the desert to a cable landing station in Jeddah before connecting to the Red Sea corridor through Egypt, meaning it depends on both choke points remaining functional.5Roderick Beck, “Subsea Cable Nightmares: Elm Street Comes to the Middle East,” Subsea Cables & Internet Infrastructure, March 14, 2026, https://subseacables.blogspot.com/2026/03/subsea-cable-nightmares-elm-street.html.   The $700 million WorldLink Transit Cable Project, whose entire premise rested on positioning the Persian Gulf as a viable alternative corridor for Asia-Europe traffic, appears likely to die on the vine.4Winston Qiu, “War in the Gulf Severs the World’s Digital Arteries: How the Iran Conflict Is Reshaping Global Connectivity,” Submarine Networks, March 15, 2026, https://www.submarinenetworks.com/en/nv/insights/war-in-the-gulf-severs-the-world-s-digital-arteries.           The Fibre in Gulf project connecting the GCC countries and Iraq has been thrown into limbo.4Winston Qiu, “War in the Gulf Severs the World’s Digital Arteries: How the Iran Conflict Is Reshaping Global Connectivity,” Submarine Networks, March 15, 2026, https://www.submarinenetworks.com/en/nv/insights/war-in-the-gulf-severs-the-world-s-digital-arteries.

Both the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea are now effectively closed to commercial cable repair vessels.4Winston Qiu, “War in the Gulf Severs the World’s Digital Arteries: How the Iran Conflict Is Reshaping Global Connectivity,” Submarine Networks, March 15, 2026, https://www.submarinenetworks.com/en/nv/insights/war-in-the-gulf-severs-the-world-s-digital-arteries.           Any cables damaged by missiles, naval mines, or the anchors of stricken ships will remain severed for the duration of the conflict.4Winston Qiu, “War in the Gulf Severs the World’s Digital Arteries: How the Iran Conflict Is Reshaping Global Connectivity,” Submarine Networks, March 15, 2026, https://www.submarinenetworks.com/en/nv/insights/war-in-the-gulf-severs-the-world-s-digital-arteries.           Multiple active cable systems serving billions of users are already living this reality.

The closure of two maritime choke points simultaneously has triggered a frantic search for overland alternatives. Gulf states are financing competing data corridors through Syria, Iraq, and East Africa to bypass the routes that their digital connectivity depends on.7Indranil Ghosh, “The Gulf Built Oil Pipelines to Avoid Hormuz. It’s Now Doing the Same for Data,” Rest of World, March 11, 2026, https://restofworld.org/2026/gulf-overland-data-cables-europe-war/.

The most advanced project is SilkLink: Saudi Arabia’s STC Group signed an $800 million contract in February 2026 to build 4,500 kilometers of fiber across Syria to a submarine cable landing station at Tartus on the Mediterranean.7Indranil Ghosh, “The Gulf Built Oil Pipelines to Avoid Hormuz. It’s Now Doing the Same for Data,” Rest of World, March 11, 2026, https://restofworld.org/2026/gulf-overland-data-cables-europe-war/.          This replaced an earlier plan to route through Israel, which collapsed after the Gaza war.7Indranil Ghosh, “The Gulf Built Oil Pipelines to Avoid Hormuz. It’s Now Doing the Same for Data,” Rest of World, March 11, 2026, https://restofworld.org/2026/gulf-overland-data-cables-europe-war/.          Qatar’s Ooredoo is building a second corridor through Iraq with a separate $500 million commitment to overland routes from Iraq through Turkey to Europe.7Indranil Ghosh, “The Gulf Built Oil Pipelines to Avoid Hormuz. It’s Now Doing the Same for Data,” Rest of World, March 11, 2026, https://restofworld.org/2026/gulf-overland-data-cables-europe-war/.          A third project, WorldLink, announced by a privately funded consortium, would run a $700 million hybrid cable from the UAE through Iraq to Turkey, though it has no named construction contractor and a five-year timeline.7Indranil Ghosh, “The Gulf Built Oil Pipelines to Avoid Hormuz. It’s Now Doing the Same for Data,” Rest of World, March 11, 2026, https://restofworld.org/2026/gulf-overland-data-cables-europe-war/.

All three front-runner corridors converge on Turkey as the gateway to Europe.7Indranil Ghosh, “The Gulf Built Oil Pipelines to Avoid Hormuz. It’s Now Doing the Same for Data,” Rest of World, March 11, 2026, https://restofworld.org/2026/gulf-overland-data-cables-europe-war/.          This consolidation is inherently problematic. Additionally, the corridors being planned as escape routes from geographic vulnerability would themselves pass through Syria, Iraq, Sudan, and Ethiopia, countries where conflict or institutional fragility has severed infrastructure before.7Indranil Ghosh, “The Gulf Built Oil Pipelines to Avoid Hormuz. It’s Now Doing the Same for Data,” Rest of World, March 11, 2026, https://restofworld.org/2026/gulf-overland-data-cables-europe-war/.

For India, the timing is particularly damaging. Research by the Observer Research Foundation indicates approximately a third of India’s westbound internet traffic travels through cables passing near the Strait of Hormuz.8Surabhi Gupta, “Buffering… How Iran War Could Put India’s Internet Connectivity at Risk,” ETV Bharat, March 13, 2026, https://www.etvbharat.com/en/bharat/experts-warn-rising-hormuz-tensions-could-hit-india-connectivity-enn26031303842.     India’s international internet traffic exits primarily through two gateways: Mumbai on the west coast and Chennai on the east, with Mumbai’s traffic largely dependent on cable systems crossing the Arabian Sea and the Gulf region.8Surabhi Gupta, “Buffering… How Iran War Could Put India’s Internet Connectivity at Risk,” ETV Bharat, March 13, 2026, https://www.etvbharat.com/en/bharat/experts-warn-rising-hormuz-tensions-could-hit-india-connectivity-enn26031303842.     Cybersecurity experts warn that if multiple cables fail simultaneously, remaining routes would become overloaded, with serious latency a