
Show HN: SentinelMCP – Stateless policy firewall and token-cost proxy for MCP
Stateless enterprise policy firewall & token-cost proxy for MCP.
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Stateless enterprise policy firewall & token-cost proxy for MCP.
Drop it in front of any Model Context Protocol server. Every tool call gets checked for identity, policy, and budget before it reaches your infrastructure — no database, no sticky sessions, nothing new to operate at 3am.
docker run --rm -it ghcr.io/asctttt/sentinel-mcp:demo
MCP made it trivial to wire an LLM agent up to real tools — databases, payment APIs, internal services. It did not ship a policy layer. If you've run an MCP server in production, you've probably already hit one of these:
Runaway loops. An agent gets stuck retrying a failing call, or a bad prompt sends it into a call-and-recall spiral. Nothing in the MCP spec stops it. You find out from the bill, not an alert.
Token budgets that don't exist until they explode. Nothing in a typical agent loop stops it from calling the same expensive tool hundreds of times in an hour. The common failure mode: a $40/day budget quietly becomes a $40k/month bill, and the first signal anyone gets is the invoice.
DNS-rebinding and confused-deputy risk. The Streamable HTTP transport spec requires Origin validation for exactly this reason — a malicious page can rebind DNS to reach a local MCP server your browser would otherwise block. Most self-hosted servers don't implement it. Stack a compromised or injected tool result on top, and "just add an MCP server" is a bigger attack surface than most teams have budgeted time to secure.
SentinelMCP won't stop a model from being tricked — no proxy can. What it does is make sure a tricked or runaway agent can't reach a tool it isn't allowed to call, blow through a budget nobody approved, or keep running once the numbers look wrong — without a human getting a say.
Zero-trust security
Origin validation on every request — the DNS-rebinding mitigation the Streamable HTTP spec requires and most self-hosted servers skip. Loopback-only by default; explicit allowlist for anything else, override not extend.
ID-JAG identity enforcement — real JWKS-backed JWT verification, asymmetric algorithms only (no HMAC-downgrade path), including the resource claim binding that closes the confused-deputy hole: a token issued for one MCP server can't be replayed against another.
Token economics
Structural token estimation — walks the actual JSON-RPC payload instead of length / 4, pricing natural-language content and JSON structure at different, calibrated rates. Input measured exactly; output projected from a per-tool rolling average and trued up against the real response after every call.
7-day sliding-window budgets per team, enforced against a fixed-memory circular buffer (168 hourly buckets) — bounded, no per-request log to prune, no unbounded growth under load.
Spike detection independent of the hard cap — a sudden burst against a team's own recent baseline gets caught even while the cumulative total is nowhere near the limit. Catches the exponential-growth pattern before the raw budget does.
Human-in-the-loop, not hard failure
A budget breach doesn't 500 the call. It returns InputRequiredResult — a normal JSON-RPC success — carrying the projected overrun, the run-rate spike, and an HMAC-signed, request-bound resumeToken.
POST /mcp/resume with { resumeToken, decision: "APPROVE" | "DENY", originalRequest } lets a human clear it. The token is bound to the exact call via a canonical-JSON hash of the request — approve this wire transfer, not whatever an agent decides to substitute next.
Delivery is transport-aware: the pause notice reaches the client over whichever channel the original call used.
Protocol support
Streamable HTTP — the current MCP standard (spec 2025-03-26+), and the primary path.
Legacy HTTP+SSE (spec 2024-11-05) for backward compatibility with clients that haven't migrated. Not the default; don't build new integrations against it.
Quickstart
git clone https://github.com/your-org/sentinelmcp.git cd sentinelmcp npm install cp .env.example .env
Six required values in .env — everything else ships with a sane default:
npm run build && npm start # production
or, for local iteration:
npm run dev # tsx watch
Confirm it's alive:
curl http://localhost:8080/healthz
How it fits
flowchart LR Client(["MCP Client<br/>Claude Desktop · Cursor · custom agent"])
subgraph Sentinel["SentinelMCP — stateless gateway"] direction TB Origin["Origin Guard<br/>DNS-rebinding check"] Policy["Policy Gate<br/>tool denylist"] Identity["Identity Gate<br/>ID-JAG · JWKS verify"] Budget["Budget Gate<br/>sliding window + spike detect"] Origin --> Policy --> Identity --> Budget end
Upstream["Upstream MCP Server(s)"] Resume["POST /mcp/resume<br/>HMAC-signed resumeToken"]
Client -->|"POST /mcp"| Origin Budget -->|"allowed → forward"| Upstream Upstream -->|"result"| Client Budget -.->|"denied → paused<br/>InputRequiredResult"| Client Client -.->|"human decides,<br/>out of band"| Resume Resume -->|"APPROVE<br/>budget bypassed only —<br/>identity + policy still enforced"| Upstream
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SentinelMCP sits in front of one or more upstream MCP servers as a reverse proxy. Every gate runs on every request; a denial short-circuits before the call ever reaches your tools. Only the budget gate can be bypassed, and only by an explicit, signed, single-call human approval — identity and policy are re-checked even on resume.
Two of the five subsystems keep state in memory (SSE session tracking and the budget ledger) — the request/response path itself is stateless and horizontally scalable behind a plain load balancer. See docs/ENGINEERING.md for exactly which pieces, and what that means for running more than one replica.
63 tests, 19 suites — npm test. Unit coverage for the token estimator, the sliding-window budget algorithm (spike detection included, verified with an injectable clock rather than waiting real days), and the HMAC token service (round-trip, tampering, forged secrets, canonical-hash binding). Integration coverage runs the full request pipeline through fastify.inject() against a real, ephemeral-port mock identity provider and mock upstream — no stubbed JWT verification, no mocked crypto.
Strict TypeScript — strict, noUncheckedIndexedAccess, noImplicitOverride. No any in the source tree.
Zero test-framework dependencies — built on Node's own node:test.
CI runs typecheck, the full suite, and a production build on every push, against Node 20 and 22.
The full engineering log — what's verified, every bug found during development and how it was fixed, and every known limitation stated plainly rather than glossed over — lives in docs/ENGINEERING.md.
SentinelMCP's core gateway is free and MIT-licensed. For teams running multiple replicas in production or requiring compliance audit trails, SentinelMCP Pro unlocks enterprise capabilities via a single SENTINEL_LICENSE_KEY environment variable:
👉 Purchase a SentinelMCP Pro License Key via Polar.sh
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