
OVH Cloud CLI Tool Hacked by Russian Threat Actors
On 2026-10-19, the official OVHcloud CLI tool was compromised by the Glassworm threat actors who published five malicious versions to GitHub and Brew
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On 2026-10-19, the official OVHcloud CLI tool was compromised by the Glassworm threat actors who published five malicious versions to GitHub and Brew
By c0a15726-c5b1-4b0d-85e6-fe15553df9e2 · 2026-10-19T22:18:58.233Z
On 19 October 2026, between 12:47 and 13:12 UTC, an attacker replaced the release binaries of five already-published versions of OVHcloud’s official CLI (ovh/ovhcloud-cli, v0.11.0 to v0.15.0) with a secret-stealing build. The uploads were made through the GitHub account HassenBF, a legitimate OVH contributor, using the ordinary GitHub Releases API. No tag was pushed and no GitHub Actions workflow ran. The malicious binary was a go build from a workstation with uncommitted changes, dropped straight onto existing releases. A downstream user whose CI pinned a SHA-256 caught it within 94 minutes. OVHcloud deleted the files at 14:21 UTC and shipped a clean, immutable v0.16.0 about three hours later.
The HassenBF account was already compromised and had been for seven months. Its public repositories show a scripted history rewrite on 5 March 2026 and a hidden preinstall.js loader that decodes to a second stage using a Solana memo dead drop. The wallet is a known GlassWorm indicator, and the amend-and-force-push technique matches the ForceMemo campaign. The earliest server-verified use of the account by the attacker is 5 March 2026, about 228 days before the asset replacement. Whether the same actor did both is our inference, and we cover its limits below.
This is a release-asset replacement attack. The source repository was never touched, so anyone verifying against the Go module proxy or building from source was fine. But anyone who ran install.sh, brew install --cask ovh/tap/ovhcloud-cli, or downloaded a tarball from GitHub in that window on macOS, Linux x86_64/arm64 or Windows x86_64 got the malware.
We built the timeline from server-side GitHub data (the repository Activity API, Actions run records and release records), not from git author, committer or tagger dates, which the pusher controls. OVHcloud deleted the replaced binaries before anyone archived them, so we have not analyzed the payload, and we could not independently confirm the 12:47 to 13:12 replacement times. Those come from the reporter’s capture in issue #300. The link between the March account compromise and the October asset replacement rests on the shared account identity, not on anything we observed directly. We found no PolinRider markers, no malicious workflow additions and no GhostAction indicators. The affected versions come from OVHcloud’s statements and the public issue, which lists v0.13.0 to v0.15.0. Release timestamps and the assets left behind show v0.11.0 and v0.12.0 were also touched.
OVHcloud’s public statements use Paris time (UTC+2), so we converted everything to UTC. By our math the attacker was swapping files for about 25 minutes, and the bad files were available to download for 94. Every row below is a GitHub server-side timestamp unless the source column says otherwise.
Force push to HassenBF/treasure-hunt-game. The new tip adds preinstall.js.
Force push to crwn-clothing. The payload is inlined in src/index.js.
Force push to next-dashboard. The new tip adds preinstall.js.
Force push to padel-bot. The new tip adds preinstall.js.
HassenBF keeps pushing branches and landing ordinary pull requests in ovh/ovhcloud-docs (release script, changelog format, linter, PDF generation).
Commit 5ead8ef merged to main (PR #296) by FrostByte0x. The malicious binary was later built from a checkout at this commit.
HassenBF deletes branches dev/test-changest and test/trigger-probe in ovh/ovhcloud-docs.
Commit 6ef70c2 merged to main, ending the window in which 5ead8ef was the tip.
First replaced assets land on v0.15.0 (Linux arm64, Linux x86_64, Darwin arm64, Darwin x86_64, Windows x86_64). Klaba’s “14h47” is this moment.
v0.15.0 checksums.txt replaced, so the new hashes match the new binaries.
v0.14.0 Linux arm64 and checksums replaced.
v0.13.0 Linux arm64 and checksums replaced. v0.11.0 and v0.12.0 replaced in the same pass per OVHcloud.
Issue #300 opened. A downstream CI job that pins the SHA-256 of ovhcloud-cli_Linux_arm64.tar.gz failed. The reporter checked go version -m, found a dirty build, and filed publicly (no private reporting enabled on the repo).
OVHcloud deletes every replaced asset across the five releases (“16:21 GMT+2”).
v0.16.0 tag push starts Build and test (actor rbeuque74) and release (triggering actor FrostByte0x). The release run fails.
HassenBF profile record updated. This field changes on any profile edit, so we don’t read it as a credential reset.
v0.16.0 assets uploaded by the ovh-cds service account, including a Release attestation (json) asset, and the release published as immutable. Klaba posts the alert on X.
OVHcloud says first checks show no other repo affected. A post-mortem is promised “in the coming days”.
The attacker was selective. Each GoReleaser release ships 9 platform archives plus checksums.txt. Only the mainstream targets were swapped: both macOS builds, Linux x86_64 and arm64, Windows x86_64, and the checksum file. The i386 builds, Windows arm64 and the WASM build were left alone. You can see this on the release pages today. v0.11.0 through v0.15.0 each have exactly four binaries left (i386 ×2, Windows arm64, WASM) with their original upload timestamps, because OVHcloud deleted the six replaced files from each release.
Darwin arm64, Darwin x86_64, Linux arm64, Linux x86_64, Windows x86_64, checksums.txt
Linux i386, Windows i386, Windows arm64, Js wasm
Linux arm64 and checksums confirmed by the reporter; same six as v0.15.0 inferred from what remains
Linux i386, Windows i386, Windows arm64, Js wasm
Linux arm64 and checksums confirmed; same six inferred
Linux i386, Windows i386, Windows arm64, Js wasm
Six inferred from what remains (OVHcloud lists it as affected)
Linux i386, Windows i386, Windows arm64, Js wasm
Six inferred from what remains (OVHcloud lists it as affected)
Linux i386, Windows i386, Windows arm64, Js wasm
None. All 10 assets intact with original 2026-03-02 timestamps
Clean rebuild, immutable, with release attestation
We think this shows what the attacker was after. They skipped the platforms almost nobody runs and the WASM target that can’t read a filesystem. This looks like credential harvesting aimed at developer and ops workstations, not a random defacement.
The one known-bad hash we have comes from the reporter’s pinned CI check:
5c2beb56e6d83a4b426565a1557791ef759316abcc4effb38dd627c90aeb80e0
3833daffcaaaab27e4e0e0833240ffcb1df8df648f4ec0bc4a75c176e28933cb
Go binaries carry their own build info, and the reporter pulled it out with go version -m before OVHcloud deleted the files:
mod github.com/ovh/ovhcloud-cli v0.15.1-0.20261013083505-5ead8ef9b43d+dirty build -ldflags="-s -w" build vcs.revision=5ead8ef9b43d354dfb5caadff803b11afc8c5c58 build vcs.time=2026-10-13T08:35:05Z build vcs.modified=true
Now compare that with how the project actually builds releases. .goreleaser.yaml sets -trimpath and -ldflags "-s -w -extldflags -static -X github.com/ovh/ovhcloud-cli/internal/version.Version={{.Tag}}". Four things don’t match.
No version.Version ldflag. A real v0.15.0 binary reports v0.15.0, but this one reports a pseudo-version. Running ovhcloud version on the malicious build would have given it away.
VCS stamping is present. GoReleaser’s -trimpath strips the vcs.* metadata, so seeing it means someone ran a plain go build in a git checkout.
vcs.modified=true (the +dirty suffix). The working tree had uncommitted changes when it was built, so the malware was patched into a local checkout and never committed anywhere.
Wrong commit. The build is from 5ead8ef (13 Oct, after v0.15.0’s 760fd72), so it includes the API v2 instance migration from PRs #292 and #293 that v0.15.0 never had. It’s a v0.16-era tree wearing a v0.15.0 filename. 5ead8ef was the tip of main from 13 Oct 08:35:05 UTC until 6ef70c2 merged on 16 Oct at 14:38:11 UTC. If the attacker built from current main, their last fetch came before that second time. A stale clone would also fit.
Klaba described the binary as looking for secrets stored on the user’s disk and called its quality mediocre but functional. OVHcloud hasn’t published what paths it reads or where it sends them. If you have a sample, the hash above will identify it.
When a release gets tampered with, the first guess is usually CI, like a poisoned Action, a leaked workflow secret, or a tag pushed to trigger a build. The evidence rules that out here.
[embedded content: attack path · 5 steps, no CI]
The release workflow never ran. .github/workflows/release.yml only fires on push: tags: v*. Tagger dates are set by whoever pushes, so we didn’t rely on them. The Actions run list is server-side. It shows no workflow run of any kind between 16 Oct 14:38:14 UTC and 19 Oct 16:00:23 UTC, which is the v0.16.0 tag push. A v* tag push on any of the older versions would have started the release workflow. Nothing ran during the replacement window, so GoReleaser was not invoked for these versions, which is also why the binary lacks GoReleaser’s ldflags. One caveat is that repo admins can delete workflow runs.
The uploads came from a human account via the Releases API. The reporter captured the uploader field on the replaced assets before deletion. It was HassenBF, not a bot, not a workflow identity, and not the amstuta account that originally published those releases. The account has merged pull requests in ovh/ovhcloud-docs and ovh/manager, but it isn’t a public member of the ovh org and has no commits in ovh/ovhcloud-cli. Uploading a release asset requires contents: write, so it had Write on the repo, most likely through the @ovh/ovhcloud-cli-owners team that CODEOWNERS grants *. Klaba confirmed this in his announcement, saying the attacker used one of the developers’ GitHub accounts and added a binary.
The cadence looks like a script. Five releases, six assets each, uploaded one at a time with checksums.txt last so the published hashes matched the new binaries, all inside 25 minutes. That’s most likely a loop over DELETE /repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/assets/{id} and POST .../releases/{id}/assets with a token in hand.
HassenBF has six public repositories, all personal learning projects. Four were force-pushed in March 2026. We got the push times from GitHub’s repository Activity API, which records every force push with the server’s timestamp. The commit’s own author and committer dates are set by the pusher, so we don’t use them.
A force push alone isn’t the indicator, because this account force-pushes routinely. padel-bot had seven in July 2025. What marks these four is that each new tip shares its parent with the old tip (the API reports ahead_by 1, behind_by 1), keeps the original author date and message, and carries the payload. It’s an amend. Three of the new tips (treasure-hunt-game, next-dashboard, padel-bot) add preinstall.js and a "preinstall": "node preinstall.js" entry to package.json. In crwn-clothing the same decoder is inlined into src/index.js, which grew from 262 bytes to 36,936.
The first three repositories were rewritten within 42 seconds, which looks like a script, not a person. The fourth followed about 44 hours later. The pushes came at 03:41 Paris time on 5 March and 23:49 on 6 March. The account’s other pushes cluster around 10:40 to 14:40 and 20:00 to 22:00 UTC, so the first push is outside its usual hours. That’s a weak signal.
The profile looked benign on a standard OSINT pass: no stealer-related stars, one commit email, activity consistent with Europe/Paris, and real contributions to OVH repositories. A clean-looking profile doesn’t rule out a hijacked account.
All three preinstall.js files are byte-identical, and the crwn-clothing variant uses the same decoder. The visible code is a short decoder that maps Unicode variation-selector characters (U+
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