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What I Mean When I Say That I Start from Absence

What I Mean When I Say That I Start from Absence

Hacker News 最新Pheverdotexe2026/10/16 · 2026/10/1630 分钟阅读

以下正文同步自 Hacker News 最新,版权归原站所有,已转换为易读排版。

Politics

Religion

Freedom

Critical Thinking

What I Mean When I Say That I Start from Absence

In Which I — a Man — Tell People with Uteri How to Feel about Childbirth and Capitalisation within Titles of Essays

Philippe Everaert-De Block

11 min read·

Just now

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I write this essay because I have a habit of talking about absence. I like absence as an idea. A lot. I also talk about it quite often. And I am often entirely unaware of the upward movement of any present sets of eyebrows when I do. But not always. Throughout this article, I will propose an analogy: “cosmic accounting” in the framework of living together as a society. I liken things like rights and liberties to entries in the assets ledger, and responsibilities to entries in the liabilities ledger. In order for the bookkeeping to remain truthful, I posit that both ledgers need to exist in the same field of existence and that this field needs to be the physical world. A list of physical assets cannot be presented alongside a list of metaphysical liabilities. In other words: one cannot properly back up a right by invoking a liability no one has access to. There is a difference between abstraction and metaphysicality. Some assets and liabilities are wholly abstract. These can be codified, have been codified, and arguably should be. Both ledgers should be available for inspection and open to attack at all times. I argue that when the liabilities ledger is pushed into the metaphysical world and cannot be retrieved from it, this ledger disqualifies itself from use as such and should be regarded as non-existent — as absent.

I think of absence as pure negation. It is not a thing. It is not an entity. It is not nothing. It is not nothingness. It cannot be because there isn’t anything to be.

Absence is a condition, an inescapable state of the universe that entails that no one inherently owes anything anything. Nothing, no one is intrinsically indebted. I will elaborate on this later on in this article.

It is not an ideal state. Any aspiration toward absence is misguided because such an aspiration is meaningless. It is also not a state to meaningfully escape from or want to escape from. One can hide from the rain but that doesn’t make the rain stop.

Any system that seeks to explain or streamline living together needs to defend its semantic added value against this absence. It shouldn’t seek to compete with it; that would be futile. A proposed system needs to be able to make its case against a Minimal Justified Codex that asks what makes a codex containing a given rule preferable to an otherwise identical codex without it (Everaert-De Block 2026a, 1–2). For example: it is reasonable to assume that a rule against theft is preferable to no rule against theft. This does not mean that any individual or collection of individuals should come to this same conclusion.

I believe the universe in which we live to be indifferent. I cannot prove that it is. But I haven’t found an alternative account that makes better sense of such a broad range of phenomena than indifference in the light of absence. That doesn’t mean that no such better alternative exists. Any instance of doubt concerning one or more phenomena doesn’t by itself prove that an alternative is true, or that indifference is false.

I want to home in on my use of the notion “indebtedness” here. What I mean when I say that nothing, no one is intrinsically indebted is that there is no phenomenon of “cosmic accounting” out there in which the existence of a being or of a thing is linked to a liability such that severing that link would make that existence impossible, and in which the link itself creates meaning. This may sound a little ridiculous, but it is actually deeply ingrained in a substantial number of distinct cultures. For example: the pain of childbirth. We tend to want to explain life’s frictions, especially extreme ones like this, in a way that makes such a phenomenon make sense beyond just our individual experience. If this extreme pain is seen as payment for the ability to create life, this phenomenon has been given meaning through the lens of “cosmic accounting”. This is no mere hypothetical. Aubry G. Smith recounts having refused an epidural because she believed that relieving the pain of childbirth would displease God (Smith n.d.). A substantial number of women have chosen to undergo the pain of childbirth when the birth itself had been deemed low-risk by professional assessment. This isn’t “wrong” in any meaningful way. And I’m not claiming that these women are aware of — or in any way should be aware of — some abstract notion of bookkeeping proposed by some Belgian beard with a distinct lack of a uterus. What I am claiming is that a substantial number of women have consciously chosen to experience that pain despite the availability of an epidural, and I believe that this cannot be merely explained by the possibility that all or most women who consciously choose to experience that pain actually enjoy that pain. I posit that their choice can be meaningfully explained by the human need to want suffering to mean something. The example of the pain of childbirth is just a very salient one because it allows us to isolate cases where women have chosen this path while an alternative is available and actively suggested.

For some scale: a study by Le Ray and colleagues, published in 2008 using French survey data from 2003, examined 8,233 low-risk births. Of the 2,720 women who delivered without an epidural, 37% reported that they had not wanted one: approximately one thousand women, or 12% of the full sample. Rapid labour, medical contraindications, and the unavailability of an anaesthetist were recorded separately (Le Ray et al. 2008). A smaller Michigan study by Gamble and colleagues, published in 2015, examined 79 women with uncomplicated births. Nine reported having been offered an epidural at least once and delivered without one; three of those reported at least three offers (Gamble, Hesson, and Burns 2015, 62, table 3). These findings establish a factual footing for the choice I am discussing. The interpretation of what may partly inform that choice is of course my own.

I also want to add that the scope for this notion of “cosmic debt” starts from the metaphysical and “descends” into the physical realm. I do not here talk about a notion of “balance” where in order to create something physical, something else that is physical must be “subtracted” from the physical realm. An example of this is Tibetan sky burials wherein the deceased’s body is ritually offered to vultures, feeding other living beings. Some Christian traditions also acknowledge this, for example the Anglican phrase from the burial service in the Book of Common Prayer: “Earth to earth, ashes to ashes, dust to dust” (Church of England 1549), famously written in 1549 by then-Archbishop of Canterbury, David Bowie. Conversely, the Catholic notion of a “sacrificial lamb” is an example of “cosmic accounting” again: the debt of others is being bestowed upon an innocent creature, which is killed by way of “cosmic interest payment”. I use the word interest here because in my interpretation of Catholic tradition, the full debt that represents Original Sin — an inherited condition — remains outstanding.

To reiterate: it is my claim that no such indebtedness exists, or needs to exist. What I attempted to prove in the previous paragraphs is that a notion of cosmic indebtedness can exist in the perception of at least some individuals within distinct cultures that supply it with meaning.

I now want to explore the relationship between this idea of cosmic accounting and the management and maintenance of the polis. In other words: in the framework of politics. I will do this by inspecting two philosophical frameworks dealing with the provenance of rights: natural rights and god-given rights. After their inspection, I will contrast them with my interpretation of absence.

God-given rights are understood to derive their authority from a divine entity, rather than from human agreement or institutions. Take the monarchical justification of why someone gets to rule over others. James I of England in the early seventeenth century is a clear example. He defended the divine right of kings: the monarch’s authority came from God, rather than being granted by his subjects. In a speech to Parliament in 1610, he described kings as “God’s lieutenants upon earth” (James VI and I 1610, 1).

By contrast, natural rights are rights understood to belong to people simply because they are human, independently of whether any law, government, or agreement recognises them. They are regarded as inherent rather than conferred.

These aren’t necessarily in opposition. There can be overlap, even significant overlap. Some accounts hold that a divine entity is the source of natural rights. The great advantage of natural rights from a distinctly humanist perspective is that this doesn’t have to be the case. What follows is that natural rights allow us to make a case for a political framework that isn’t reliant on how people interpret the will of one or more divine entities or on the account of individuals who have been specifically assigned the role of interpreters of the will of the gods.

The distinction between the two views on the provenance of rights has, however, provided the basis for heated debate in the past and remnants of this debate arguably still linger to this day. For example, the animosity in the Belgian Parliament in the second half of the 19th century between liberal factions and Catholic factions is well-documented. Even today, some “dignity of life” issues have a tendency to make coalition discussions potentially more difficult than they need to be when representatives of Christian Democrat parties are involved.

But the debate over the provenance of rights has always struck me as odd. I think it may have even been the initial engine for my ideas around absence. I accept that the concept of rights exists within an accounting method that links them to responsibilities. Respectively as assets and liabilities. This is simply a codex. Habeas corpus is a pristine example of this. What I find strange is when this notion of rights extends into the metaphysical realm. This is where both the ideas of god-given rights and natural rights pale a little against absence. Whenever a representative of a liberal democratic government mentions the right to freedom of expression as a positive right, I always think to myself: yes, but doesn’t that amount to simply utilising one’s freedom? I do not need anyone’s permission to go stand in Lokeren’s town square and yell at the top of my lungs that I love my wife dearly and I’m the luckiest man alive because I am married to her. Incidentally, I also don’t need anyone’s permission to go stand in Lokeren’s town square and yell at the top of my lungs that every single passerby’s mother has a history of sex work in which she consistently undercut the prices of the competition. All of these utterances may be true or false, and I may or may not be aware of whether they are one or the other. That doesn’t mean that I personally believe any one of those to be a good idea. I will refer to my paper Defining Freedom and Liberty for further elaboration on this (Everaert-De Block 2026b, 2).

Rights make sense as assets within the framework of physical accounting of Liberties as Lived Freedom: the relational form freedom takes when we live together. I compare this to my previous mention of Tibetan sky burials. The ledgers are physically next to each other. The carbon that my body is made up of won’t suddenly vanish upon my inevitable, cinematic demise by light sabre. Cosmic accounting, like in the case of the sacrificial lamb, pushes one of the two ledgers out of reach, into the metaphysical realm. And this constitutes my confusion over the phenomena of natural rights and god-given rights: both ledgers

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