
Nono: Agent Runtime Security
Agent runtime security. Kernel-enforced boundaries for AI agents, with zero setup and zero latency.
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Agent runtime security. Kernel-enforced boundaries for AI agents, with zero setup and zero latency.
Install
curl
$curl -fsSL https://nono.sh/install.sh | sh
Homebrew
$brew install nono
Debian · Fedora · Arch · Nix →
Quickstart
Find a package
$nono search pi↳nolabs-ai/pi
Run it, sandboxed
$nono run --profile nolabs-ai/pi -- pi
Created by the team behind Sigstore
The industry standard for software signing, used by PyPI, Homebrew, Maven, Google, GitHub, and NVIDIA.
Every tool call gets an ephemeral micro toolbox, scoped to only the files, network routes, arguments, and credentials it needs. Every decision is auditable.
How nono's ephemeral micro toolboxes work: a coding agent runs a tool invocation, for example gh issue view. The nono supervisor resolves and verifies the executable, evaluates argv policy for the caller and arguments, and on approval creates a fresh, invocation-scoped micro sandbox around the tool with only its selected capabilities: read-only workspace, no filesystem writes, no host secrets, bounded stdout and stderr, and network access only through the nono proxy. The sandbox receives a phantom GH_TOKEN; the real credential stays with the supervisor and never enters the child. The proxy validates the phantom token, evaluates HTTP method and path policy, injects the real credential at the boundary, and forwards over TLS to api.github.com. If an action falls outside the provided policy, the policy engine can route it to a human approval decision to approve, deny, or time out. Security-relevant events are hash-chained into an audit record sealed with a SHA-256 Merkle root, and the sandbox is destroyed when the invocation exits. Four scenarios: Allowed read — gh issue view runs, POST /graphql is allowed by the proxy, and output returns to the coding agent. Human approval — gh pr merge matches no argv rule, so the exact invocation pauses for a human decision and, once approved, executes inside a scoped sandbox. Argv denied — gh issue comment is refused at argv authorization; no sandbox or outbound request is ever created. L7 denied — gh api passes the broad argv rule, but the POST to the repository comments endpoint is denied at the proxy; nothing reaches GitHub.
AGENT SESSIONLIVEUUSERWhat changed in issue #1052?AGENTLet me check the issue.ghTOOL CALLGitHub · View issuenolabs-ai/nono · #1052TOOL RESULTIssue #1052 · Brokered tool isolationOpen · 14 commentsRESOLVED INVOCATIONgh issue view 1052 --repo nolabs-ai/nonoNONO · POLICY + CAPABILITY BROKER01EXECUTABLEgh · digest verified02ARGV POLICYissue viewALLOW03CAPABILITIESread-only · proxy-only04CREDENTIALreal token remains hereOUTSIDE PROVIDED POLICYHUMAN APPROVALapprove · denyHUMAN-IN-THE-LOOPNONO MICRO SANDBOXINVOCATION-SCOPEDPROCESS MODULE>_ ghPID 48291 · issue view 1052FILESYSTEMWORKSPACE · READWRITESDENIEDSTDIO1 MB · BOUNDEDNETWORKPROXY ONLYGH_TOKEN=nono_cd07…L7 PROXYINSPECTPOST /graphqlALLOWINTERNET · GITHUB APIapi.github.comTAMPER-EVIDENT AUDITresolveargv.allowspawncredentiall7.allowseal9a3b7c1d…6082
AGENT SESSION
LIVE
USER
What changed in issue #1052?
INTERNET · API.GITHUB.COM
TAMPER-EVIDENT AUDIT
resolve → argv → spawn → l7 → seal
MERKLE ROOT
9a3b7c1d…6082
Allowed: gh issue view ran inside a fresh invocation-scoped micro sandbox with a phantom GH_TOKEN. The proxy allowed POST /graphql and injected the real credential at the boundary; the audit record was sealed with a SHA-256 Merkle root and the sandbox was destroyed.
The agent never talks directly to the isolated tool. Requests, credentials, network traffic, stdio, and audit events cross the supervisor boundary.
nono sandboxes any terminal agent. Pull a signed profile from the registry and run — no wrappers, no rewrites.
At scaleEngineers at some of the world’s largest tech companies run nono to protect their agents.
It scales from a single laptop to fleets of agents without changing the model — the same composable policy, per-tool sandboxing, credential protection, and fully auditable execution.
Composable policy
Scalable JSON profiles that compose across teams and version-control alongside your code.
Tool-specific sandboxing
A sandbox tuned to each agent and tool — least privilege by default, not one blunt boundary.
Credential protection
Secrets are injected at the boundary and never exposed to the agent. Zeroised on exit.
Fully auditable
Every action lands in a cryptographic, tamper-evident audit trail you can verify.
Member of Technical Staff, Leading Cyber @ OpenAI
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