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China's Growth Machines

Imagine if Y Combinator owned and ran San Francisco. Too much traffic? That’s bad for business. Highway 101 would be triple- or quadruple-deckered, and the metropolitan area might have a dozen subway lines, more like Ma…

Hacker News 最新karakoram2026/10/16 · 2026/10/1630 分钟阅读

以下正文同步自 Hacker News 最新,版权归原站所有,已转换为易读排版。

Imagine if Y Combinator owned and ran San Francisco. Too much traffic? That’s bad for business. Highway 101 would be triple- or quadruple-deckered, and the metropolitan area might have a dozen subway lines, more like Madrid’s or Osaka’s networks than the BART as it stands. Heritage buildings? They’re nice, but this is a tech town. Skyscrapers would fill the entire peninsula. Instead of wealth taxes on billionaires, the city might even cut taxes to encourage more founders and companies to move there.

This is only a slight caricature of how city government works in China. Provincial cities like Hefei and Hangzhou have become world-leading centers of commerce in electric vehicles, consumer electronics, solar panels, batteries, and AI, steered by mayors whose career incentives are similar to those of partners in a venture capital firm, getting promoted if their portfolio grows and fired if it fails. The cities they run function as vertically integrated conglomerates that benefit not just from the success of their local champions, but also from the broader growth generated by masses of companies in their slipstream.

The heavy state involvement correctly perceived by observers belongs not to Beijing but to those local governments, of which China has thousands, and which compete with one another for investment and prestige. These local growth machines and the competition between them are what drives China’s stunning economic success, and what the Western world must embrace to keep up.

For the initial decades after China’s economic opening in the 1980s, ‘Made in China’ meant cheap goods mass-produced for Western businesses. Today, Chinese companies lead the world in high-tech manufacturing, and many of them are household names in the West. Huawei is arguably the world’s most advanced telecoms company; BYD is the largest electric automaker; and DJI makes over 90 percent of consumer drones. Less familiar but no less important are companies like Geely, an auto giant which began in the 1980s as a refrigerator parts manufacturer and now owns Volvo, Lotus, Polestar and a stake in Aston Martin; and Vivo, now India’s biggest smartphone supplier.

What all have in common is that Beijing played no role in their creation. They were private companies encouraged by local governments. Huawei, BYD, and DJI emerged from Shenzhen’s Special Economic Zone, where municipal bureaucrats could write local regulations without regard for national rules. Geely was quietly supported by Zhejiang province at a time when only state-designated automakers were meant to build cars. Vivo spun off from a company founded in Dongguan, after Zhongshan, the neighboring city, wouldn’t give the company leaders equity.

Some sectors, such as batteries, electronics, and most recently electric vehicles, have received special support from Beijing as strategic industries. Companies in these areas benefited from subsidies, tax rebates, and in the case of electric cars, sales tax exemptions. But though the state was happy to lend its support to certain sectors, it was agnostic as to which specific firms and regions rose to dominance by means of that support. Beijing set a prize, and local bureaucrats competed to win it.

Hefei, the capital of Anhui province in inland Eastern China, is the most famous illustration of this process in action. In 2008, the municipal government invested $500 million in the electronic display company BOE Technology to build a new-generation LCD production line, bringing China to the cutting edge of panel production for the first time. At the time, Hefei was an unremarkable city with no display industry, and BOE was only the world’s ninth-largest manufacturer of LCD displays. The city provided the necessary land, utility connections, and cheap capital (investing almost a tenth of its total revenue that year) to set up a subsidiary company with BOE, in which it had an 81 percent stake. The bet paid off. BOE is now the world’s largest display panel manufacturer and makes about a quarter of smartphone screens worldwide.

The city reinvested the returns from its investment in other venture capital–like bets, which have won big surprisingly often. Hefei’s investment in carmaker NIO, which the city backed in 2020 in exchange for a 24 percent stake, paid off with an internal rate of return exceeding 30 percent. CXMT (Changxin Memory Technologies), 24 percent of which is directly or indirectly owned by the city of Hefei, runs just behind Samsung, SK Hynix, and Micron with 7 percent of the global market for DRAM chips, the short-term memory used in smartphones, PCs, and data centers. Over the decade to 2023, the city had invested roughly $25 billion of public funds, generating reported earnings of nearly $9 billion.

Other cities have followed the venture capital model to bring in similar growth in jobs and tax revenues. The city of Wuhu imported a secondhand Ford engine line from Britain, lured engineers away from state behemoth FAW (First Automotive Works), and copied a Volkswagen design to build a local carmaker. That makeshift venture eventually grew into Chery, today one of the country’s leading carmakers and supplier of Britain’s bestselling car in March 2026, the Jaecoo 7. As well as having seen growth in jobs, exports, and tax revenues, the city of Wuhu retains a 21 percent stake in Chery, worth around $3.7 billion.

Ningde, a relatively modest city in Fujian province in the southeast, is the founding site of CATL, now the world’s biggest battery producer. The city’s leaders made a strategic wager from its founding in 2011, committing land, infrastructure, tax support, administrative coordination, and supplier attraction efforts to help the still-young battery company to scale. CATL’s bases in Ningde now have capacity to produce 330 gigawatt hours of batteries per year – equivalent to almost half the global demand for electric vehicle batteries in 2023.

China’s mayors and provincial governors turn their cities into venture capital portfolios because of the system of incentives in which they operate. 2 Each cadre (the party members and other officials who run the Chinese state) is scored by their superiors in a secret file built up over the course of their career. Prefecture-level party secretaries evaluate county chiefs, who in turn evaluate their juniors heading up townships, who evaluate village leaders, down to the lowest party member.

Promotions – not just for politicians, but across the civil service – are based in large part on scoring the economic performance of the province or city that a cadre is responsible for. For example, the Shaoxing Municipal Party Committee’s 2008 assessment for city leaders featured 100 base points, of which 54 were awarded for economic development, including growth in GDP per capita, local revenue, industrial investment, and exports. Across China in the 2000s, officials who presided over growth 3.3 percentage points higher than their predecessors were 40 to 50 percent more likely to be promoted. Whereas success leads to promotion, failure can mean early retirement, demotion, or disciplinary action.

To further incentivize bureaucrats, promotions are governed by strict, albeit not explicit, age ceilings. A cadre must make the jump from county officialdom to prefecture level by their mid-forties, must take the next jump to provincial or ministerial level by their mid-fifties, and is unlikely ever to reach the Politburo if they have not done so by their sixties. Missing an age window means being locked into a lower tier for the rest of their lives.

What makes these incentives work is the fact that, unlike in many Western systems, provincial governments get to keep much of the money they generate. After 1980, when China’s economy first started to open up, provinces retained roughly 75 of every 100 marginal yuan they raised. Many provincial governments negotiated deals in which they agreed in advance how much income they would owe to Beijing over the next five years or more, meaning that every yuan they subsequently did or didn’t raise went onto their own balance sheet. By 1990, the average marginal retention rate was nearly 90 percent. Local government incentives were sharpened even more after 1994, when a package of reforms cut the share of VAT that provinces and cities kept, leaving them with a hunger for revenue, but often allowed them to keep 100 percent of the upside from state-owned enterprises, and the ability to sell land-use rights, almost all of whose revenues they could keep.3

The way these incentives play out is illustrated in the career of Li Qiang, today China’s second most powerful man. Li started at the bottom: he was born in 1959 to an unremarkable family in Rui’an, an ancient but small city in Zhejiang province, and worked factory clerk jobs before joining the local branch of the Communist Party in 1983. Over the following twenty years he pursued a career in local politics, holding a string of provincial posts.

In 2002, he was made party secretary of Wenzhou, a larger city in the same province. Even under communism, Wenzhou had been seen as an outpost of entrepreneurship and private business within Zhejiang. Li’s strategy was to encourage more private companies to start up, bring private capital into infrastructure, and release bottlenecks on land and labor. Wenzhou’s GDP grew 14.8 percent during his first year in charge. After a second year of rapid growth, this time 14.1 percent, he was appointed chief of staff to the provincial party secretary, Xi Jinping.

When Xi took over in Beijing in 2013, Li was promoted to the provincial governorship himself. Li described his strategy as getting the government out of the way to ‘allow the market to play its decisive role, further stimulating the entrepreneurial and innovative drive of the masses’. Zhejiang must replace the ‘restless hand’ of government intervention with the ‘invisible hand’ of market competition, he said. In practice this meant scrapping 8,000 of the province’s legal powers, including over 700 approval requirements.

After success in Zhejiang, Li was put in charge of Jiangsu, before being brought to Shanghai itself. In Shanghai, he once again focused on freeing up private capital. He set up a new stock market, STAR, which became one of China’s main exchanges within a year of launching. He presided over an expansion of Shanghai’s free trade zone. And he announced a raft of reforms to increase the ease of doing business as in Wenzhou, focused on reducing permit requirements.

In 2022, after climbing the ranks for 39 years, Li was elevated to the Party’s top decision-making body, the seven-person Politburo Standing Committee. As the second-ranking committee member, he was now junior only to his former boss, Xi Jinping.

The entire Chinese bureaucracy is staffed this way, from the smallest village to the country’s capital itself. Being a local government bureaucrat is a very different proposition in China than it is in the West. China’s public servants are more like company directors than administrators, making investments to increase their division’s financial performance and improve their professional prospects.

Competition is the driving force of Chinese industrial success. Instead of a single body making decisions for the entire country and passing them down, there are hundreds. When a strategy is proven to work, the country doubles down on it. In this, it is similar to American capitalism, with its hedge funds, investment banks, and venture capitalists, each a competitive central planner, portioning out capital for a sliver of the United States economy.

But China takes it further. In American capitalism, each individual ‘player’ represents their own interests, but nobody represents the interests of the game as a whole, which often makes coordination problems hard to solve. China’s competitive municipal socialism works because of local governments’ role as, effectively, landowners.

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