The Freight-App Battle a Chinese “Uber for Trucks” Couldn’t Win

In 2018, Kuaigou Dache spent RMB524 million on sales and marketing, more than its RMB453 million in revenue. Eight years later, its listed parent, GOGOX, conditionally agreed to sell its mainland China business for just RMB1. Under an October 16 filing, GOGOX plans to sell its subsidiary GGEx Holdings and rename itself GOGO Technology. The deal remains subject to conditions and shareholder approval. In the first half of 2026, the mainland business generated RMB44 million in revenue but lost RMB49.3 million after tax, with net liabilities of RMB2.48 million. That sounds like a shutdown, but GOGOX later clarified that only ownership would change. Kuaigou Dache, a mainland Chinese freight and moving platform, is expected to continue operating under its new owner. GOGOX, the listed parent, plans to exit mainland China and focus on Hong Kong and other overseas markets.

The Fee Model Was Part of the Story

Kuaigou’s roots lie in 58 Suyun, a freight business under 58 Daojia, associated with 58.com, often likened to China’s Craigslist. In 2017, 58 Suyun merged with Hong Kong-founded GOGOVAN; the combined company adopted the Kuaigou Dache name in 2018. Photo by Théo Dorp on Unsplash Credit: Photo by Théo Dorp on Unsplash Much like booking a ride on Uber, customers could use Kuaigou’s app to book a truck, select a vehicle, enter pickup and drop-off locations, and check the fare. According to GOGOX’s IPO prospectus, matching algorithms then connected orders with drivers based on location, vehicle type and ratings. The rivals also took different routes to charging drivers. Lalamove, known as Huolala in mainland China, introduced a membership-plus-transaction-fee model in 2016. Kuaigou followed in 2018, after relying more heavily on per-order fees. Memberships may lower per-order fees in exchange for upfront payments, while commissions tie platform revenue to completed bookings. But neither model guarantees driver loyalty: what matters is how many jobs drivers get and how much they take home after fees.

Scale Is Harder to Copy Than Fees

Both platforms spent heavily to attract shippers and drivers, betting that more users would mean denser networks, shorter waits and more orders per driver. But discounts don’t guarantee loyalty, and even sophisticated matching software is of little use without enough orders and drivers in each area. Kuaigou struggled to keep pace. In 2021, it held 3.2% of mainland China’s online intra-city logistics market by transaction value, versus 52.8% for Lalamove and 5.5% for Didi Freight. By 2025, a separate estimate based on closed-loop freight GTV put their shares at 0.5%, 61% and 12.4%, respectively. Although the estimates use different market definitions, both put Kuaigou well behind its larger rivals.

A Costly Battle, a Strategic Retreat

Hong Kong and other overseas markets accounted for 85% of GOGOX’s revenue in the first half of 2026, though revenue from those markets fell 4.3% year on year. The company operates in Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, India and Vietnam, facing Lalamove across the region, Porter in India’s truck-hailing market and GrabExpress in Southeast Asia’s parcel-delivery segment. Kuaigou’s decline was about more than pricing. Years of heavy marketing spending failed to close the gap with Lalamove, while Didi Freight and Manbang added to the competition. Drivers tend to favor platforms with more available jobs, while shippers want trucks when and where they need them. Kuaigou struggled to build a network on the same scale as its larger rivals. GOGOX cited intensifying competition and weaker-than-expected growth in mainland China. The result was a costly fight for market share that never translated into a strong enough position to sustain the business.